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Courts and the Executive in Wartime: A 
Comparative Study of the American and 
British Approaches to the Internment of 
Citizens during World War II and Their 
Lessons for Today 
Amanda L. Tyler* 
This Article compares and contrasts the legal and political 
treatment of the detention of citizens during World War II in Great 
Britain and the United States. Specifically, it explores the detentions 
as they unfolded, the very different positions that President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill took with respect 
to the detention of citizens, and the manner in which British and 
American courts reviewed challenges brought by those detained 
during the war. Comparing the experiences of the two countries 
reveals that in both cases the courts deferred extensively to the 
political branches when it came to reviewing challenges to the wartime 
detention policies, essentially staking out roles that left them largely 
relegated to the sidelines of public debates over the propriety of 
internment policies. A comparison of the British and American 
experiences also reveals that, as the war continued, the two chief 
executives struck decidedly different positions as to the wisdom and 
lawfulness of detention policies directed at citizens. In the United 
States, Roosevelt ignored the legal advice of many of his key advisers 
regarding the unconstitutionality of the detention of Japanese 
American citizens and—again against the advice of his advisers—later 
delayed the closing of the internment camps until after the 1944 
election. By contrast, Churchill—who operated in a different legal 
context that granted him greater powers than his American 
counterpart—came to view such policies as inconsistent with British 
constitutional tradition and became a crucial voice urging the 
termination of such detentions. 
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The Article then attempts to understand both why the two 
executives charted different courses on this issue as the war unfolded 
and whether there are any lessons to be drawn from these events with 
respect to how we should think about the separation of powers during 
wartime today. Focusing on the British experience during the war, 
Churchill’s change of course suggests that the executive can and 
sometimes will take the lead in declaring and protecting a country’s 
constitutional values without prodding by the courts, even in wartime, 
and even in the absence of legal compulsion. But as is explored in the 
pages that follow, the British experience may be a particularly British 
story and more generally one that differed in significant ways from the 
American story. This, in turn, calls into question just how much the 
British experience during the war should inform debates over the 
separation of powers in American constitutional law. The American 
experience during the war, moreover, proves a cautionary tale. 
Specifically, it reveals a series of failings on the part of the executive 
branch to acknowledge and engage with the facts on the ground and 
honor long-accepted constitutional traditions in formulating wartime 
policies. This example therefore suggests that the executive branch is 
ill equipped to self-regulate on this score in times of war. These 
failings in turn call into question the common practice of courts to 
defer extensively to the executive on matters of national security and 
more generally implicate fundamental questions about the judicial 
role in a constitutional democracy. 
Although grounded in events that took place over seven decades 
ago, this study is undertaken for a very timely purpose. Once again, 
we live in a time in which the executive branch has argued that its 
decisions ostensibly predicated upon heightened concerns about 
national security should receive extensive, if not complete, deference 
from the Supreme Court. In addressing such arguments now and in the 
future, the Court would be wise to remember how judicial deference to 
executive branch assertions on matters of national security played out 
during World War II. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without 
formulating any charge known to the law, and particularly to deny him 
judgement by his peers for an indefinite period, is in the highest degree 
odious, and is the foundation of all totalitarian Governments . . . . 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1943)1 
Unless the Writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended, I do not know of any 
way in which Japanese born in this country and therefore American 
citizens could be interned. 
                                                            
 1. Cable from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Home Secretary Herbert Morrison (Nov. 
21, 1943), in 5 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: CLOSING THE RING app. A, Book 
2 at 679 (1951). 
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Attorney General Francis Biddle (January 1942)2 
[I]f it a question of safety of the country, the Constitution of the United 
States, why the Constitution is just a scrap of paper to me. 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy (February 1942)3 
February 19, 2017, marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of the issuance of 
now-infamous Executive Order 9066 by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
What followed is well known to anyone versed in the events of World War II on 
the home front. In the wake of 9066’s issuance, the United States witnessed, 
among many things, military regulations that imposed curfews, designated huge 
portions of the western United States as military areas of exclusion, and 
ultimately created “relocation centers” across the west—all aimed at controlling 
the movements of, and eventually involuntarily incarcerating,4 approximately 
120,000 persons of Japanese descent. Those detained under military orders 
during this period included over 70,000 United States citizens.5 
Unearthing archival materials from the days and weeks leading up to 
issuance of 9066 reveals that key government officials—including President 
Roosevelt—knew or were counseled that any internment of Japanese American 
citizens would be in clear violation of the Suspension Clause of the United States 
Constitution.6 Indeed, Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Francis Biddle, repeatedly 
made this very argument to the President and members of Congress. Roosevelt 
nonetheless issued 9066, giving the military, in the words of one senior War 
Department official, “carte blanche” to proceed as it saw fit.7 And later, when 
urged to shut down the camps, Roosevelt resisted, capitulating only after the 
1944 election. 
Meanwhile, to bolster 9066 and the War Department’s actions, Congress 
enacted legislation criminalizing violations of the military regulations issued 
                                                            
 2. Letter from Attorney General Francis Biddle to Representative Leland Merritt Ford (Jan. 
24, 1942) (Justice Department files), in MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND 
THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 257 (1949). 
 3. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Major Karl R. Bendetsen, assistant to the 
Judge Advocate General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, Provost Marshal General of the U.S. Army, 
and General Mark W. Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army Ground Forces at 2 (Feb. 4, 1942), in 
Documents of the Committee on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 5936, 5937, reel 5, at 
579 (Frederick, MD, University Publications of America 1983) (quoting General Gullion’s statement 
recounting “what McCloy said.”) 
 4. The appropriateness of the term that should be used to describe the detention of Japanese 
Americans by the United States government during the war is debated among those who write about 
this period. This Article will at times use the term “internment” as the commonly used shorthand for the 
detention of Japanese Americans in Relocation Centers during the war, remaining mindful of these 
important debates. 
 5. The citizenship numbers surely would have been higher had then-existing naturalization 
laws not discriminated based on race, a practice that ended with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. ch. 12). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
 7. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 218 (1962) (quoting Assistant Secretary of War 
John J. McCloy). 
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under 9066, rendering defiance of those regulations something few would risk.8 
When a handful of courageous individuals chose to defy certain regulations 
anyway, their prosecutions and convictions set in motion events that eventually 
landed their cases before the Supreme Court. In those cases, and one other that 
challenged outright the detention of Japanese Americans during the war, the 
Court was at best unwilling to engage with the Constitution in evaluating the 
government’s actions and at worst complicit in the constitutional violations that 
led to the mass detention of Japanese Americans in the first place.9 
In the decades since President Roosevelt issued 9066, both Congress and 
several presidents have offered apologies and declared that what happened 
during the war should never happen again.10 Congress also enacted legislation 
for the purpose of thwarting any future attempts to imprison United States 
citizens solely based on military orders.11 Further, presidents have awarded the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom to three of the litigants, who—at great personal 
sacrifice—violated and then challenged the military regulations issued pursuant 
to 9066 all the way to the Supreme Court, highlighting their courage and efforts 
to raise awareness of this important period in history.12 These three individuals, 
Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu, also successfully 
pursued coram nobis proceedings to overturn their earlier criminal convictions 
under the military regulations. 
In 1983, decades after the war, Congress ordered a thorough study of the 
events leading up to and surrounding the implementation of 9066.13 In its report, 
the commission appointed by Congress concluded that the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II was the product of “race prejudice, 
                                                            
 8. See Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (repealed 1976). 
 9. The four cases to make their way to the Court out of the West Coast were Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); and Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). As is discussed below, Endo 
comprised a habeas challenge to the internment policy. 
 10. Many examples exist. They include the statement issued by President George H.W. Bush 
on the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1991: “No nation can fully understand itself 
or find its place in the world if it does not look with clear eyes at all the glories and disgraces, too, of the 
past. We in the United States acknowledge such an injustice in our own history: The internment of 
Americans of Japanese ancestry was a great injustice, and it will never be repeated.” George H.W. Bush, 
Remarks to World War II Veterans and Families in Honolulu, Hawaii, 1991 PUB. PAPERS 1573, 1574 
(Dec. 7, 1991), https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/3719 [http://perma.cc/G65W-
J39C]. 
 11.  See Non-Detention Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–128, 85 Stat. 847 (1971) (codified in 18 
U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012)). 
 12. Specifically, Presidents Clinton and Obama awarded Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, 
and Minoru Yasui the Presidential Medal of Freedom. As I have written elsewhere, Mitsuye Endo 
Tsutsumi, who died in 2006, deserves the same recognition. See Amanda L. Tyler, Unsung WWII Hero 
Deserves the Medal of Freedom, SACRAMENTO BEE (August 25, 2016), 
https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article97641497.html [https://perma.cc/4E25-J8T2]. 
 13. COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED: PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1983) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, PT. 
2]. 
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war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”14 Notably, the commission 
also concluded that “no documented acts of espionage, sabotage or fifth column 
activity were shown to have been committed by any identifiable American 
citizen of Japanese ancestry or resident Japanese alien on the West Coast” in the 
period leading up to the orders.15 And, just this past Term, the Supreme Court 
overruled (albeit in dictum) its infamous decision in Korematsu v. United States, 
a 1944 holding that rejected a challenge to the discriminatory aspects of the 
exclusion orders issued under 9066 during the war.16 
Across the Atlantic in Great Britain during the war, Regulation 18B of the 
wartime Defence (General) Regulations empowered the executive to detain 
outside the criminal process those citizens believed to pose a danger to national 
security. In contrast to the staggering numbers of Japanese Americans interned 
during the war in the United States, the Home Office detained just shy of 2,000 
British citizens under Regulation 18B during the same period. Nonetheless, at 
least one modern commentator has labeled the detentions “as gross an invasion 
of British civil liberty as could be conceived.”17 When the detention program 
commenced, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was reportedly an enthusiastic 
supporter.18 Indeed, when speaking more generally of wartime enemies within 
Great Britain at the start of the war, Churchill famously proclaimed: “Collar the 
lot!”19 When challenges to the program found their way into the courts during 
the war, they ran directly or indirectly into the proposition that Parliamentary 
sovereignty is a basic principle of the unwritten British constitution. (The United 
Kingdom’s Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this idea in its Brexit decision.20) 
Put another way, it is essentially a canonical proposition that Parliament 
possesses “the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever.”21 As history had 
revealed long before, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty meant that even 
the celebrated English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and its important protections 
of individual liberty existed at the mercy of Parliament. And so it was that 
                                                            
 14. Id. at 5. 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the 
day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law 
under the Constitution.’” (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting))). 
 17. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN 
WARTIME BRITAIN 1 (reprint 2005) (1992). Simpson’s book provides an extensive analysis of the 
detentions that followed under Regulation 18B. Simpson continued the above sentence by observing 
that the detentions were “only justifiable, if at all, by the grim necessity of the time.” Id. 
 18. See id. at vii. 
 19. PETER GILLMAN & LENI GILLMAN, ‘COLLAR THE LOT!’: HOW BRITAIN INTERNED AND 
EXPELLED ITS WARTIME REFUGEES 153 (1980). 
 20. See R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 (appeal 
taken from Eng. and Wales). 
 21. Id. (quoting A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 38 (8th ed. 1915)). 
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Regulation 18B and all the detentions that followed under it almost entirely 
escaped judicial scrutiny. 
Notably, however, as the war continued, Regulation 18B and the detentions 
under it garnered a new and severe critic in Prime Minister Churchill. 
Specifically, by the fall of 1943, Churchill wrote of the importance of “the great 
principle of habeas corpus and trial by jury, which are the supreme protection 
invented by the British people for ordinary individuals against the State.”22 At 
this point, Churchill argued for the repeal of 18B, counseling “strongly” that 
“such powers . . . are contrary to the whole spirit of British public life and British 
history.”23 Churchill’s change of course came in the face of broad support for 
continuing the 18B program. In an important message to his Home Secretary, 
Churchill not only urged the repeal of 18B, he also observed that “[p]eople who 
are not prepared to do unpopular things and to defy clamour are not fit to be 
Ministers in times of stress.”24 To posit that Churchill’s approach during the war 
on this score differed from that of his American counterpart, Roosevelt, would 
be an understatement of considerable proportions. 
This Article compares and contrasts the legal and political treatment of the 
detention of citizens during World War II in Great Britain and the United States. 
Specifically, it explores the detentions as they unfolded, the very different 
positions taken by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt with 
respect to the legality of such policies, and the treatment of the challenges to 
detention that made their way into the British and American courts. Given that 
Great Britain and the United States share a common legal tradition in which the 
privilege of the storied writ of habeas corpus looms large, there is much to be 
learned from drawing such comparisons. 
To begin, the courts in both countries deferred extensively during the war 
to the political branches when it came to reviewing challenges to the wartime 
detention policies. Specifically, in Great Britain, the Law Lords declined to 
scrutinize the basis for detentions or second-guess the Home Secretary’s good 
faith in issuing orders.25 Meanwhile, in the United States, the Supreme Court 
only pushed back on the government’s wartime policies after the war, having 
handed down its infamous Korematsu decision (and two other decisions of 
similar effect) during the war.26 That resistance came in the Court’s 1946 
decision in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,27 which held unlawful the government’s 
declaration of martial law in the Hawaiian Territory during the war. (To be sure, 
                                                            
 22. Cable from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Home Secretary Herbert Morrison (Nov. 
21, 1943), in 5 CHURCHILL, supra note 1, at 679. 
 23. Cable from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee and 
Home Secretary Herbert Morrison (Nov. 25, 1943), in 5 CHURCHILL, supra note 1, at 680. 
 24. Cable from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Home Secretary Herbert Morrison (Nov. 
29, 1943), in 5 CHURCHILL, supra note 1, at 681. 
 25. See Liversidge v. Anderson UKHL [1942] AC 206 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 26. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
 27. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
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the Court’s 1944 decision in Ex parte Endo28 did hand the government a loss 
with respect to the full breadth of its internment policies, but the Court decided 
the case on the narrowest possible grounds and delayed issuing the decision to 
permit the White House to preempt its effect.) Thus, during the war, it is fair to 
say that the courts in both countries staked out roles that left them largely 
relegated to the sidelines of public debates over the propriety of internment 
policies. 
As the war continued, however, the two chief executives struck markedly 
different positions on the wisdom and lawfulness of detention policies directed 
at citizens. In the United States, Roosevelt ignored the legal advice of many of 
his key advisers regarding the unconstitutionality of the detention of Japanese 
American citizens and—again against the advice of his advisers—later delayed 
the closing of the Japanese American detention camps until after the 1944 
election. By contrast, Churchill, who operated in a decidedly different legal 
context that did not include a written constitution and granted him greater powers 
than his American counterpart, came to question such policies (in particular, 
Regulation 18B, which established the relevant governing framework) and 
argued against their continuation as the war unfolded. 
What can be learned from these comparisons to shed light on how we 
should think about the separation of powers in wartime today? To begin, training 
one’s focus on the British experience during the War and specifically Churchill’s 
change of course suggests that the executive can, and sometimes will, take the 
lead in declaring and protecting a country’s constitutional values without 
prodding by the courts—even in wartime and even in the absence of legal 
compulsion. There are, however, reasons to pause before assigning too much 
weight to the British experience for purposes of informing contemporary debates 
about the separation of powers in American constitutional law. This is because 
Churchill operated within a constitutional tradition that looked to Parliament—
and not so much the courts—to protect individual liberty. Thus, many of the 
leading works on the British Constitution say very little about the British courts, 
instructing instead, as Sir Ivor Jennings once wrote, that “[t]he law is what 
Parliament provides, and it is in Parliament that the focus of our liberties must 
be found.”29 Further, unlike Roosevelt, Churchill did not face a general election 
during the war, which insulated him to some extent from popular pressures.30 
(Notably, Roosevelt only relented to closing the camps in the United States after 
winning the 1944 election.) 
It was also the case that individuals swept up in the detentions that followed 
under Regulation 18B included Churchill’s relatives by marriage and a segment 
                                                            
 28. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 29. IVOR JENNINGS, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 208 (5th ed. 1966). 
 30. Pursuant to a truce among the leading parties, no elections occurred in Great Britain during 
the war, with the first general election coming two months after VE Day in July 1945. See STEPHEN 
BROOKE, LABOUR’S WAR: THE LABOUR PARTY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 37–38, 326–37 
(1992). 
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of British society that was not ethnically distinct from those in power. The 
contrast with American detention policies during the war—which exclusively 
targeted persons of Japanese ancestry—highlights the significance that race 
surely played in the two countries as the policies were implemented and 
reviewed. Indeed, the Japanese American community had been excluded from 
full integration into American society, and, as is explored below, the Supreme 
Court even called into question their ability to assimilate during the war in its 
Hirabayashi decision. The distinctive aspects of the American experience 
underscores that there are times when countermajoritarian courts may be 
especially important to the enforcement of constitutional norms, given their 
ability to protect minority rights in the face of majoritarian political pressures. 
More generally, the American experience during World War II proves a 
cautionary tale on just about every front. Studying the series of failings on the 
part of the executive branch that led to the internment and violated long-accepted 
constitutional traditions (of which its officers were plainly aware) calls into 
question the ability of the executive branch to self-regulate on this score. (In 
some respects, this is not surprising given that, as will be shown, Roosevelt made 
clear his belief that it was for the courts to wrestle with such questions.) As a 
review of the period leading up to implementation of the Japanese American 
internment demonstrates, moreover, the executive branch misrepresented 
enormously important factual matters to the courts when its actions came under 
legal challenge. Together, these failings highlight the perils in the common 
practice of courts to defer extensively to the executive on matters of national 
security, as the Supreme Court did during the war. Ultimately, studying the 
American experience during the war implicates fundamental questions about the 
judicial role in the American constitutional tradition and particularly the 
American separation of powers. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a primer in the English legal 
origins of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before discussing how habeas 
law has unfolded in the United States and in Great Britain since American 
independence. Accordingly, this Part discusses the Suspension Clause in the 
United States Constitution, which protects the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus from suspension, and the evolution of British habeas law, giving special 
attention to events spanning the last century. As part of this discussion, the 
Article gives an overview of the profound influence that the English Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1679 wielded on the development of Anglo-American habeas law 
and eventually the United States Constitution. 
Part II turns to the British experience during World War II, exploring the 
implementation of Regulation 18B, the challenges to 18B that made their way 
into British courts, and Prime Minster Churchill’s changing views of the 
regulation. As this Part reveals, during the war, as in earlier periods of English 
and British history, the storied writ of habeas corpus remained powerfully 
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influential in how government actors navigated the legal landscape of executive 
detention in wartime. 
Part III trains its focus on the United States, picking up the story in the 
immediate wake of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor to discuss the 
government’s initial reaction to the attack and the events that transpired in the 
Hawaiian Territory, where suspension and martial law governed during much of 
the war. Next, the Article turns to the mainland and traces the developments 
leading up to the issuance of 9066 and its early implementation, highlighting the 
lack of any concrete evidence to support the policies put in place under 9066. 
This Part also underscores the fact that many noteworthy members of the 
Roosevelt Administration—including the Attorney General—recognized that 
the detention of United States citizens outside the criminal process and in the 
absence of a valid suspension violates the Suspension Clause. 
In Part III, the Article studies the wartime period’s Supreme Court 
decisions to try and understand why the Suspension Clause played no role in the 
Court’s deliberations. As part of this analysis, the Article gives special attention 
to the often-overlooked but important case of Ex parte Endo as well as the 
Court’s postwar Duncan v. Kahanamoku decision, which rebuked the 
government’s military rule of the Hawaiian Territory during the war. 
Finally, Part IV connects and compares the British and American 
experiences with detention of citizens during World War II to ascertain what this 
period in history can teach us today about the ability of the executive branch to 
self-police for compliance with constitutional values in wartime as well as the 
proper role of the courts during such periods. 
Although grounded in events that took place over seven decades ago, this 
study is undertaken for a very timely purpose. Once again, the Supreme Court 
has been called upon to address challenges to executive branch actions during a 
time of heightened concerns about national security, with terrorism remaining an 
ever-present threat to the United States. And once again, in defending its actions 
in the face of legal challenges, the executive branch has maintained that its 
decisions should receive extensive, if not complete, deference from the Court. 
Just last Term, the current administration argued that the Supreme Court should 
defer extensively to—if not decline to review outright—its judgments regarding 
national security. In particular, and the administration called for deference from 
the Court with respect to its judgements that informed the contours of the third 
iteration of the so-called “Travel Ban,” which bars individuals from certain 
countries from entering the United States. In that case, Trump v. Hawaii, the 
government argued that its policy followed directly from the President’s 
authority over the borders, national security, and foreign policy.31 Further, before 
the Court, the government assailed lower court decisions that had struck down 
the policy for “overrid[ing] the President’s judgments on sensitive matters of 
                                                            
 31. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25–26, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-
965). 
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national security and foreign relations, and severely restrict[ing] the ability of 
this and future Presidents to protect the Nation.”32 As we now know, a majority 
of the Supreme Court sided with the Administration and upheld the Travel Ban, 
doing so in part based upon its belief that the judiciary “cannot substitute [its] 
own assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such matters 
[relating to “national security interests”], all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and 
involve large elements of prophecy.’”33 Against the backdrop of the history 
explored herein, the Article concludes by arguing that any evaluation of the 
Court’s deference to the executive branch in the Travel Ban litigation and more 
generally the proper judicial role in times of war should take into account how 
judicial deference to executive branch assertions regarding matters of national 
security played out during World War II. 
I. 
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus” and the concept of 
suspension both trace their origins to English judicial and parliamentary practice. 
Thus, before discussing the place of these concepts in the modern legal 
frameworks of Great Britain and the United States, it is imperative that one study 
the English backdrop upon which modern habeas jurisprudence in both countries 
is predicated.34 Put another way, borrowing from Chief Justice John Marshall, to 
understand the role of habeas corpus in the Anglo-American legal tradition, one 
must look to the privilege’s origins in English law. As he once phrased it, “this 
great writ” was “used in the constitution, as [a term] which was well 
understood.”35 
The story begins with the common law writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum, a judicial creation that demanded cause for a prisoner’s detention 
from his jailer.36 As historian Paul Halliday has detailed, the common law writ 
came into regular use in the seventeenth century as a “writ of the prerogative”—
namely, as the embodiment of royal power invoked by the Court of King’s Bench 
in aid of the king’s obligation to look after his subjects.37 Over time, English 
                                                            
 32. Id. at 16. 
 33. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (internal citation omitted); see id. at 2422 (positing that “the 
Executive’s evaluation of the underlying facts is entitled to appropriate weight, particularly in the context 
of litigation involving ‘sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs’”). 
 34. For greater explication of this background, consult AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS 
IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY (2017) [hereinafter TYLER, 
HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME]. 
 35. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830). 
 36. This writ, also called ad subjiciendum et recipiendum, translates as “to undergo and receive” 
the “corpus,” or body, of the prisoner. The writ was directed to the relevant custodian, or jailor, who had 
custody of the prisoner. 
 37. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 9 (2010). As 
Halliday recounts, Chief Justice Sir Henry Montagu described habeas corpus in 1619 as a “writ of the 
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judges came to employ the writ as a tool for inquiring into both the cause of the 
initial arrest and ongoing detention of those who could claim to fall within the 
protection of domestic law.38 Nonetheless, early in the seventeenth century, royal 
courts regularly countenanced habeas returns that cited the King’s command to 
imprison as sufficient justification to detain, or at least sufficient to preclude 
judicial inquiry into detention. Courts did so based on the contemporary 
understanding that the crown’s directives themselves constituted the “Law of the 
land.”39 
Over the course of the seventeenth century, judicial and legislative 
developments moved toward rejecting the idea that the royal command alone 
could constitute legitimate cause to arrest and detain. An enormously important 
moment in the story came with the passage of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679. Parliament’s adoption of the Habeas Corpus Act coincided with the rise of 
parliamentary supremacy and a broader parliamentary effort to take control over 
matters of detention from the monarch and its courts. With the Act, Parliament 
came to manage and define what constituted legal cause to detain. In so doing, 
royal fiat ceased to suffice. 
A. The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and the Early English 
Suspensions 
The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 proved the culmination of a 
lengthy effort during the seventeenth century, spearheaded at its origins by John 
Selden and Sir Edward Coke, to secure strict limitations on what would 
constitute legitimate “cause” for the crown’s detention of individuals.40 The Act, 
entitled “An Act for the better securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for 
Prevention of Imprisonments beyond the Seas,”41 declared that it was intended 
to address “great Delayes” by jailers “in makeing Returnes of Writts of Habeas 
Corpus to them directed” as well as other abuses undertaken “to avoid their 
yielding Obedience to such Writts . . . .”42 Toward that end, the Act declared that 
it was “[f]or the prevention whereof, and the more speedy Releife of all persons 
imprisoned for any such criminall or supposed criminall Matters.”43 
                                                            
prerogative by which the king demands account for his subject who is restrained of his liberty.” Id. at 
65 (quoting Habeas Corpus al Cinque-Ports pur un Borne Imprison La (1619) 81 Eng. Rep. 975 (KB)). 
 38. Id. at 48–53. 
 39. See, e.g., Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 St. Tr. 1. 22 H. (KB) (Eng.), in 3 COBBETT’S COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1 (1809) (often called the “Case of the Five Knights”). 
 40. For an explication of the period leading up to and surrounding enactment of the English 
Habeas Corpus Act, consult Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus 
Act and the Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1949 (2016) 
[hereinafter Tyler, A Second Magna Carta]. 
 41. 31 Car. C. 2 (Eng.). 
 42. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDER’S 
CONSTITUTION 310 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). By its terms, the Act sought to 
remedy the fact that “many of the King’s subjects have beene and hereafter may be long detained in 
Prison in such Cases where by Law they are baylable.” Id. 
 43. Id. 
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Accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Act’s focus—cases involving persons 
imprisoned “for any Criminall or supposed Criminall Matter”—serves to 
underscore its close connection to the criminal process.44 In short order, the Act 
came to be understood as embracing not just the cases of ordinary criminals, but 
domestic enemies of the state as well. 
Many of the Act’s provisions codified preexisting, though not necessarily 
uniformly followed, judicial practices tied to the common law writ. It is therefore 
important to understand that in practice the Act served to complement the 
common law writ, using the preexisting writ as a vehicle for enforcing its terms. 
The common law writ, as Blackstone noted, also continued to serve as the 
vehicle for redress available in “all . . . cases of unjust imprisonment” that were 
not covered by the Act.45 But beyond codifying certain practices already 
followed by some courts, where the Act applied, Parliament took control over a 
good deal of habeas law from the courts, and it did so with a statute that by its 
terms required courts to follow its mandates under threat of penalty.46 
Further, with the Act, Parliament drastically limited the justification for 
detentions that would survive legal scrutiny. For example, the third section of 
the Act set forth procedures for obtaining writs during court vacation periods, 
and later sections provided that the Act would reach so-called “privileged places” 
and other areas previously beyond the range of habeas courts. Additionally, the 
seventh section made clear the connection between the writ of habeas corpus and 
the criminal process. It covered “any person or persons . . . committed for High 
Treason or Fellony” and provided that where a prisoner committed on this basis 
was not indicted within two court terms (a period typically spanning only three 
to six months), the judges of King’s Bench and other criminal courts were 
“required . . . to sett at Liberty the Prisoner upon Baile.”47 Finally, the section 
declared that “if any person or persons committed as aforesaid . . . shall not be 
indicted and tryed the second Terme . . . or upon his Tryall shall be acquitted, he 
shall be discharged from his Imprisonment.”48 
Thus, in its seventh section, the English Habeas Corpus Act promised 
release to those held for criminal or “supposed” criminal matters, including even 
the most dangerous of suspects—those detained on accusations of treason—
                                                            
 44. Id. 
 45. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *137 (observing that “all other cases of unjust 
imprisonment” not covered by the Act were “left to the habeas corpus at common law”) [hereinafter 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES]. 
 46. 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 10. 
 47. Id. §§ 3, 7 (emphasis added). The judicial mandates came under threat of financial penalty 
at set forth in Section 10. See id. § 10. Note that over time the relevant language from section 7 moved 
to section 6 of the Act. 
 48. Id. Judges initially often evaded the Act’s protections by setting excessive bail; for that 
reason, the Bill of Rights in 1689 declared that courts should not require excessive bail. See Bill of Rights 
of 1688, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.). 
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where they were not timely tried.49 Those held for suspected treason during the 
Jacobite Wars of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and later during 
the American Revolution, routinely invoked the Act’s protections to their 
benefit, either to force timely trial on criminal charges or secure their discharge.50 
Military detention no longer existed for those who could claim the protections of 
domestic law. Instead, the Act promised such persons the protections of the 
criminal process in a timely fashion or else their freedom. Nor did the Act include 
any exceptions for times of war. It is for this very reason that Parliament invented 
the concept of suspension as a tool for displacing the protections associated with 
the Habeas Corpus Act during wartime. 
It took Parliament only ten years to do so. The historical episodes of 
suspension during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries demonstrate that 
the consistent purpose behind them was the empowerment of the executive to 
arrest suspected traitors outside of the formal criminal process. For example, the 
very first suspension, which came in 1689 in the immediate wake of the Glorious 
Revolution, expanded the authority of the crown dramatically in the face of 
threats to the throne.51 Having just been crowned in place of the dethroned James 
Stuart, King William of Orange asked Parliament to suspend the Habeas Corpus 
Act in order to arrest—solely on suspicion—Jacobite supporters who sought to 
reinstate the Stuart line.52 As William’s emissary conveyed the request to 
Parliament, the King sought the power to confine persons “committed on 
suspicion of Treason only,” lest they be “deliver[ed]” by habeas corpus.53 
Parliament quickly obliged and in so doing created the concept of suspension. 
In the decades that followed, numerous attempts by the Jacobites to regain 
the British throne, combined with constant fighting with France, triggered 
additional suspensions.54 In each of these suspensions, Parliament empowered 
the crown to arrest, on suspicion alone, individuals believed to pose a danger to 
the state and to detain them for the duration of the suspension without obligation 
                                                            
 49. Chief Justice John Holt wrote shortly after passage of the English Act that its 
“design . . . was to prevent a man’s lying under an accusation for treason, &c. above two terms.” 
Crosby’s Case (1694) 88 Eng. Rep. 1167, 1168 (K.B.) (Holt, C.J.). 
 50. For details on many such cases, consult Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American 
Revolution, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 635 (2015) [hereinafter Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American 
Revolution]. 
 51. 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.); see also 2 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE 
OF COMMONS: FROM THE RESTORATION TO THE PRESENT TIME 284–85 (Richard Chandler ed., 
London, n. pub 1742) (noting royal assent granted on March 16, 1689). 
 52. For details, see TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34, at 35–39. 
 53. 9 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, FROM THE YEAR 1667 TO THE YEAR 1694, at 
12930 (Anchitell Grey ed., London, n. pub. 1763) (remarks of Richard Hampden). For discussion of this 
suspension and its extensions, along with subsequent suspensions during the following decades, consult 
Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 
934–44 (2012) [hereinafter Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause]. 
 54. The last suspension predating the American Revolution came in response to the Jacobite 
Rebellion in Scotland in 1745. For details, see TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34, at 
40–51. 
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to try them on criminal charges.55 Notably, in every one of these episodes, 
suspension was understood as setting aside the protections of the seventh section 
of the Habeas Corpus Act, as well as any complementary common law habeas 
role for the courts. Accordingly, the suspension model established during the 
period leading up to the Revolutionary War contemplated that it was only by 
displacing the seventh section of the Act that detention outside the criminal 
process of persons who could claim the protection of domestic law could be 
made lawful—even in wartime.56 
B. The English Habeas Corpus Act and Suspension in the Early American 
Experience 
Although the British suspension model was well settled by the middle of 
the eighteenth century, the American Revolutionary War placed tremendous 
pressure on its stability. Meanwhile, the movement for independence that drove 
the war proved an opportunity for the Americans to build their own legal 
frameworks. 
The American Founding generation knew a great deal about the benefits of 
the English Habeas Corpus Act. Indeed, the crown’s denial of the Act’s 
protections to the colonists constituted a major complaint about British rule and 
contributed to the movement for independence. In 1774, the Continental 
Congress decried the fact that colonists were “the subjects of an arbitrary 
government, deprived of trial by jury, and when imprisoned cannot claim the 
benefit of the habeas corpus Act, that great bulwark and palladium of English 
liberty . . . .”57 Such complaints followed on the heels of several failed efforts by 
various colonies to adopt the Act for themselves.58 Steeped in their Blackstone, 
the colonists read that the Act was a “bulwark” of “liberties” and a “second 
magna carta.”59 They wanted to enjoy this second Magna Carta too. 
This patchwork legal framework—the Act applying in some geographic 
areas of the British Empire, but not in others—came to play a major role in how 
                                                            
 55. See id. 
 56. That being said, during this same period, Parliament also often invoked its power of attainder 
to circumvent the protections of the Habeas Corpus Act. Id. at 45–46 (detailing the plight of John 
Bernardi). As a separate matter, suspension was not understood as necessary to detain those properly 
classified as prisoners of war for preventive purposes. See 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM 
CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 159 (Sollom Emlyn ed., Philadelphia, Robert 
H. Small 1847) (“[T]hose that raise war against the king may be of two kinds, subjects or foreigners: the 
former are not properly enemies but rebels or traitors . . . .”); see also HALLIDAY, supra note 37, at 170–
73. 
 57. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 88 (Worthington 
Chauncey Ford ed., 1904); see also id. at 10708 (reiterating the same complaints) (replicating Lettre 
Adressée aux Habitans de la Province de Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774)). 
 58.  For details, see TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34, at 101–08. 
 59. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 45, at 133. Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
which grew out of his lectures, were published between 1765 and 1769. The timing and circulation of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries meant that they wielded profound influence on the development of early 
American law. 
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the British treated their so-called American “Rebel” prisoners captured during 
the Revolutionary War. A steady stream of prisoners brought to England early 
in the War led the Prime Minister, Lord Frederick North, to push for a suspension 
in order to detain American Rebels on English soil outside the criminal process.60 
The most notable of the early detentions, and a major impetus for suspension, 
was the case of Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys, who had been 
captured during their failed attempt to take the city of Montreal. In short order, 
British Lieutenant Governor Cramahé ordered Allen along with his cohort of 
“Rebel Prisoners” dispatched to England. Cramahé did so, in his words, because 
he had “no proper Place to confine them in, or Troops to guard Them” in 
Canada.61 After a weeks-long journey across the Atlantic Ocean, the prisoners 
landed in Falmouth, England days before Christmas in December 1775.62 The 
British imprisoned Allen and his Boys at Pendennis Castle in Cornwall. But 
within only a few days, the British legal elite met and decided to send Allen and 
his fellow Rebels back to America as soon as possible.63 Why? 
The answer to this question reveals a great deal about the status of Anglo-
American habeas law during this important period. To begin, it is apparent that 
political calculations were very influential here, stemming from the North 
Administration’s apparent uncertainty as to whether it could successfully 
prosecute the Rebels as traitors. Further, extensive contemporary evidence 
suggests that efforts were underway to invoke the protections of the English 
Habeas Corpus Act on behalf of Allen and his fellow Rebels in the British 
courts.64 Internal documents memorializing British officials debating what to do 
with Allen show how these factors influenced those decisions made with respect 
to the detention of Allen and his Boys. As one admiralty lord wrote just days 
after Allen’s arrival in England, the Administration’s “principal object” must be 
“to get the prisoners out of reach as soon as possible.”65 Out of reach of what? 
The answer, most likely, was the British courts, where a subject like Allen—held 
on English soil—had the right to invoke the protections of the Habeas Corpus 
Act and thereby force his trial or else secure his freedom. But across the Atlantic, 
                                                            
 60. For details, see Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American Revolution, supra note 50, at 667–
70. 
 61. Id. at 649–55 (detailing Allen’s capture, transport, detention, and dispatch back across the 
Atlantic). 
 62. Id. 
 63. For details, see Letter from Lord George Germain to the Lords Commanders of the 
Admiralty (Dec. 27, 1775), The National Archives (TNA) (Great Britain) CO 5/122/398. 
 64. For example, The Annual Register for 1775 reported of the prisoners: “whilst their friends 
in London were preparing to bring them up by habeas corpus, to have the legality of their confinement 
discussed, they were sent back to North-America to be exchanged.” 18 THE ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A 
VIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LITERATURE, FOR THE YEAR 1775, at 187 (J. Dodsley ed., 
London 1776). Similar stories ran contemporaneously in multiple other British papers, including several 
that named prominent habeas counsel with ties to the American cause as having taken on the case. 
 65. Letter from Lord Hugh Palliser to the Earl of Sandwich (Dec. 29, 1775), in 1 THE PRIVATE 
PAPERS OF JOHN, EARL OF SANDWICH, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY 1771–1782, at 87 (G.R. Barnes 
& J.H. Owen eds., 1932). 
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the Habeas Corpus Act did not apply, or at least, that was the position that the 
crown had taken for some time. Thus, by sending Allen back across the Atlantic, 
the administration could elude the Habeas Corpus Act. 
As the Revolutionary War continued, however, British ships began arriving 
in a constant stream to deposit American prisoners on British shores. This meant 
that Parliament had to address the legal status of American Rebels held on 
English soil, where the Habeas Corpus Act was in full effect. In early 1777, Lord 
North responded to these developments by invoking the same tool that earlier 
administrations had wielded during similar periods of unrest: he proposed a 
suspension. Introducing the measure to Parliament, Lord North explained: 
[I]t had been customary upon similar occasions of rebellion, or danger 
of invasion, to enable the king to seize suspected persons . . . . But as 
the law stood . . . it was not possible at present officially to apprehend 
the most suspected person . . . . It was necessary for the crown to have a 
power of confining them like other prisoners of war.66 
In other words, the North Administration sought to legalize the detention of 
American Rebels during the war without having to bring them to trial on criminal 
charges. 
As enacted, the suspension legislation applied only to persons suspected of 
high treason or piracy committed in America or on the high seas and authorized 
their detention without bail or mainprize.67 Parliament was careful to target only 
Americans, and did so for the purpose of addressing “a Rebellion and War [that] 
ha[s] been openly and traiterously levied and carried on in certain of his 
Majesty’s Colonies and Plantations in America, and Acts of Treason and Piracy 
[that] have been committed on the High Seas.”68 Acknowledging that many 
American prisoners “have been, or may be brought into this Kingdom, and into 
other Parts of his Majesty’s Dominions,” Parliament embraced the need for 
legislation modeled upon earlier suspension acts. It did so because, as it 
explained in the Act’s terms, “it may be inconvenient in many such Cases to 
proceed forthwith to the Trial of such Criminals, and at the same Time of evil 
Example to suffer them to go at large.”69 Parliament subsequently extended the 
legislation several times to last through much of the war. 
Once enacted, the legislation, popularly known as North’s Act, quickly 
earned the ire of Americans. George Washington complained in his Manifesto 
that Parliament had now sanctioned “arbitrary imprisonment” by reason of the 
                                                            
 66. 19 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE 
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 4 (T.C. Hansard ed., London 1814) (remarks of Lord Frederick 
North given to the House of Commons on February 6, 1777). 
 67. Although legally distinct from bail, mainprize served a similar function by setting a party at 
liberty until a stipulated date of appearance. 
 68. An Act to Impower his Majesty to Secure and Detain Persons Charged with, or Suspected 
of, the Crime of High Treason, Committed in any of his Majesty’s Colonies or Plantations in America, 
or on the High Seas, or the Crime of Piracy, 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (1777) (Gr. Brit.).  
 69. Id.; see 35 H.L. JOUR. (1777) 78, 82–83 (Gr. Brit.) (noting royal assent given March 3, 
1777). 
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“suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act.”70 Over the course of its lifetime, the Act 
rendered lawful the indefinite detention without trial of almost three thousand 
captured Americans brought to England during the Revolutionary War. 
It was only once independence became a foregone conclusion that 
Parliament finally permitted the suspension to lapse, recognizing that the law 
was no longer necessary to hold the remaining American prisoners on English 
soil without trial. As peace negotiations got under way, Parliament declared that 
the British Government’s relationship with the American prisoners—now 
viewed as being in the service of a newly acknowledged (if not yet formally 
recognized) independent country—was no longer governed by domestic law. 
Instead, Parliament declared that the Americans would have to look for 
protection to the Law of Nations, which permitted the detention of prisoners of 
war without criminal trial for the purpose of preventing their return to the 
battlefield.71 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the newly declared 
independent states were embracing as their own the English Habeas Corpus Act 
as well as the concept of suspension in some cases. In studying the legal 
frameworks of the original states, one finds extensive evidence indicating that 
the idea of the habeas privilege was inextricably linked to the English Habeas 
Corpus Act, and unsurprisingly, a number of states quickly moved to adopt the 
Act’s terms formally as part of their new constitutions and codes.72 
During the Revolutionary War, moreover, at least six of the newly declared 
independent states enacted their own suspension acts modeled on English 
                                                            
 70. George Washington, Manifesto of General Washington, Commander in Chief of the Forces 
of the United States of America, in Answer to General Burgoyne’s Proclamation (July 19, 1777), in 
47 THE GENTLEMAN’S MAGAZINE, AND HISTORICAL CHRONICLE FOR THE YEAR 1777, at 
456–57 (Sylvanus Urban ed., London, Sept. 1777), reprinted in CONTINENTAL J. & WKLY. 
ADVERTISER 3 (Bos.) (Mar. 5, 1778). 
 71. The statute declared that “it may and shall be lawful for his Majesty, during the Continuance 
of the present Hostilities, to hold and detain . . . as Prisoners of War, all Natives or other Inhabitants of 
the Thirteen revolted Colonies not at His Majesty’s Peace.” The Act likewise authorized the discharge 
or exchange of such prisoners “according to the Custom and Usage of War, and the Law of 
Nations . . . any Warrant of Commitment, or Cause therein expressed, or any Law, Custom, or Usage, 
to the contrary notwithstanding.” See An Act for the Better Detaining, and More Easy Exchange, of 
American Prisoners Brought into Great Britain of 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 10 (1782) (Gr. Brit.); see also 
36 J. OF HOUSE OF LORDS 1779–1783 at 425–426 (London 1767–1830) (Gr. Brit.) (noting royal 
assent given March 25, 1782). 
 72. The prominence of the Act in early American legal discourse is demonstrated in many 
quarters. For instance, South Carolina’s newly declared independent General Assembly took up 
confirmation of the Act’s operation in March 1776 as one of its very first matters. See JOURNAL OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, MARCH 26, 1776–APRIL 11, 1776, at 21, 24, 26 (A.S. 
Salley, Jr. ed., 1906). Another prominent example may be found in Georgia’s Constitution of 1777, 
which included the express provision that “[t]he principles of the habeas corpus act shall be a part of this 
constitution.” GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LX. Georgia even went so far as to append verbatim copies of 
the English Habeas Corpus Act to its original distribution to ensure that all understood the link between 
its constitution’s habeas clause and the English Act. See CHARLES FRANCIS JENKINS, BUTTON 
GWINNETT: SIGNER OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 109 (1926). 
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precedents from the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.73 The states did 
so in order to legalize the detention of the disaffected outside the criminal 
process. Notably, some of these suspensions expressly set aside the Habeas 
Corpus Act. For example, in Maryland, its suspension legislation declared that 
“during any invasion of this state by the enemy, the habeas corpus act shall be 
suspended, as to all such persons . . . .”74 
In the years during and following the war, a wave of states adopted (or, in 
some cases, reaffirmed) the core terms of the English Habeas Corpus Act, 
including particularly its seventh section, as part of their statutory law. Other 
states constitutionalized the Act’s terms. Some did so explicitly—as in the case 
of Georgia75—while others connected the habeas privilege to the concept of 
suspension and embraced the principle that without a suspension, anyone held 
on suspicion of criminal activity must be tried in due course, as in the case of the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.76 
Further, just three months before the Constitutional Convention convened 
in Philadelphia in 1787, New York passed a statute almost identical to the 
English Habeas Corpus Act. The legislation, tracking the seventh section of its 
English predecessor, made express the requirement that any person “committed 
for any treason or felony” who is not “indicted and tried [by] the second term [of 
the] sessions” of the relevant court “after his commitment . . . shall be discharged 
from his imprisonment.”77 Highlighting the pervasive influence of the English 
Habeas Corpus Act on the development of early American law, the great New 
York jurist and legal commentator Chancellor James Kent observed in 1827 that 
“the statute of 31 Charles II. c. 2 . . . is the basis of all the American statutes on 
the subject.”78 
                                                            
 73. These states included Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Virginia, 
and New Jersey. For details of these suspensions, consult Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the 
Suspension Clause, supra note 53, at 958–68. 
 74. An Act to Punish Certain Crimes and Misdemeanors, and to Prevent the Growth of Toryism, 
ch. 20, § 12 (Feb. 5, 1777), in 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 338, 340–41 (Virgil Maxcy ed., Philip H. 
Nicklin & Co. 1811). 
 75. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LX. 
 76. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII (“The privilege and benefit of the writ of 
Habeas Corpus, shall be enjoyed in this Commonwealth, in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and 
ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing 
occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding twelve months.”). The debates leading up to adoption 
of this provision, which demonstrate its connection to the protections of the English Habeas Corpus Act, 
are discussed in Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, supra note 53, at 963–
64. 
 77. An Act for the Better Securing the Liberty of the Citizens of this State, and for Prevention 
of Imprisonments (Feb. 21, 1787), in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 369, 371–72 (Thomas 
Greenleaf ed., 1792). 
 78. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 24 (1827). 
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C. Constitutionalizing the Privilege and Recognizing a “Partial Bill of 
Rights”79 
Such was the backdrop against which the American Founding generation 
drafted and ratified the Suspension Clause. It should therefore come as no 
surprise that the suspension framework tethered to the English Habeas Corpus 
Act continued to exert profound and extensive influence on American habeas 
jurisprudence—and particularly the Suspension Clause. 
When the delegates to the Constitutional Convention convened in 1787, 
they set to work on a new federal structure that would replace the Articles of 
Confederation, which had established the structure of the federal government 
since independence. It was within the larger conversation about an independent 
federal judicial branch that the delegates turned to two protections that British 
rule had denied the colonists: namely, the rights associated with the English 
Habeas Corpus Act and the right to jury trial.80 As the Convention unfolded, 
however, the delegates devoted only very limited time to debating the terms of 
what ultimately became the Suspension Clause in the United States Constitution. 
Four days after the Convention came to order, Charles Pinckney introduced 
a draft plan to the Convention. It received no reported discussion, yet one of his 
proposals laid the groundwork for the Suspension Clause and introduced a 
concept that would survive in the Clause’s final form—namely, the restriction 
on suspensions “except in case of rebellion or invasion.”81 Months later, 
Pinckney moved again for recognition of the habeas privilege, hand-in-hand with 
limitations on when it could be suspended.82 As limited debate unfolded days 
later, the delegates came instead to embrace Gouverneur Morris’s proposed 
language, which read: “The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion the public safety may 
require it.”83 
                                                            
 79. The Antifederalist publication, the Federal Farmer, while critical of the draft Constitution 
lacking a Bill of Rights, pointed to the Suspension Clause as a start. See Letter IV from the Federal 
Farmer to the Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 42, 45–46 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1983) (positing that “the 9th and 10th Sections in Art. I. in the proposed constitution, are no more nor 
less, than a partial bill of rights; they establish certain principles as part of the compact upon which the 
federal legislators and officers can never infringe” and arguing that “this bill of rights ought to be carried 
farther”). 
 80. For details, see TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME supra note 34, at 125–29. 
 81. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 148 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1881) 
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (replicating Charles Pinckney’s draft plan, Article VI). 
 82. Specifically, Pinckney’s proposal read: “The privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas 
corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be 
suspended by the Legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a time period 
not exceeding months.” James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 20, 1787), in 
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 340, 341 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 83. Id. at 438 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Madison’s notes from the Convention recount that, at this point, the 
delegates took a vote on Morris’s proposal. All agreed on the first part, which, 
standing alone, prohibited suspension under any circumstances: “The privilege 
of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended.” It was the second part of 
the proposed clause, which recognized a power to suspend “in cases of Rebellion 
or invasion, [where] the public safety may require it[,]” that elicited dissent in 
the ranks. Specifically, three states voted against including such language in the 
habeas clause: North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.84 Nonetheless, the 
delegates approved Morris’ language, and the Committee of Style modified it 
only slightly by substituting “when” for “where.”85 
Notably, evidence suggests that the delegates clearly recognized an 
important connection among habeas corpus, suspension, and requiring the 
criminal prosecution of those taken into custody who could claim the protection 
of domestic law. For example, the delegates initially placed the Suspension 
Clause in the judiciary article (then-Article XI), right alongside the guarantee 
that “[t]he trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury.”86 
Further, in promoting the draft Constitution in the Federalist Papers, 
Alexander Hamilton lauded the fact that the Constitution provided for “trial by 
jury in criminal cases, aided by the habeas corpus act.”87 Hamilton’s language 
exemplified the widespread association of the proposed Suspension Clause with 
the English Habeas Corpus Act. Indeed, participants throughout the Ratification 
Debates connected the two directly. Others simply took for granted that the 
Clause’s limitations on suspension were intended to safeguard the very 
protections that Parliament created suspension to set aside—namely, those 
associated with the seventh section of the English Habeas Corpus Act.88 
Highlighting the profound influence of the English Habeas Corpus Act on the 
Suspension Clause, Chief Justice Marshall would later write that when 
interpreting the Suspension Clause, we must look to “that law which is in a 
                                                            
 84. See Madison, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 82, at 438; see also 1 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 81, at 270 (reporting the approval of Morris’s proposed wording). 
 85. See Report of Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 82, at 596. 
 86. Madison, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 82, at 438 (internal quotation mark 
omitted). The drafters originally put the two provisions in Article XI, Sections 4 and 5. See id. 
Later, the Committee of Style reorganized the articles and separated the two clauses. See Report of 
Committee of Style, in 2 id. at 590, 596, 601; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (Jury Clause). 
 87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 88. As noted above, see supra note 79, even the Antifederalist Federal Farmer pointed to the 
Suspension Clause and its neighboring provisions as “a partial bill of rights.” Letter IV from the Federal 
Farmer to the Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), in Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the 
System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary 
Alterations in It (1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214, ¶ 2.8.51, at 248 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); see also id. ¶¶ 2.8.51–.52, at 248–49. For greater discussion of this 
point, consult TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34, at 130–133. 
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considerable degree incorporated into our own”—specifically, “the celebrated 
habeas corpus act” of 1679.89 
D. Suspension and the Privilege in the Early American Experience 
Studying the early periods in which the Suspension Clause was, to borrow 
Madison’s term, “liquidated,” reveals that the same understanding of the 
privilege and the purpose of suspension controlled American constitutional 
thinking from the Founding era well through Reconstruction.90 For example, 
during the Whiskey Rebellion, President George Washington advised his 
military generals that those participating in the rebellion were “to be delivered 
to the civil magistrates” in order to be prosecuted for their acts.91 Further, 
“Washington . . . sought constantly to get [military leaders] to impress on their 
troops the necessity for proper conduct and strict observance of their roles as 
assistants to the civil authority.”92 “He assured us,” said one chronicler of the 
episode, “that the army should not consider themselves as judges or executioners 
of the laws, but as employed to support the proper authorities in the execution of 
them.”93 
During the War of 1812, President James Madison took a similar view of 
the limits of executive authority in the absence of a suspension, subscribing to 
the position that citizens suspected of aiding the British could not be held in the 
absence of criminal charges and could not be tried by military tribunals.94 Even 
Thomas Jefferson, who initially ordered the military arrests of several Burr 
Conspiracy participants, relented in the face of Congress’s failure to pass a 
suspension bill and turned over the prisoners to civilian authorities for 
prosecution in the ordinary course.95 
This widely held understanding of the habeas privilege and its relationship 
to suspension remained largely unchanged even during the Civil War. Thus, 
although President Abraham Lincoln claimed that the executive could suspend 
the privilege ahead of Congress, he never questioned the necessity of suspension 
as providing the legal imprimatur for arrests outside the criminal process—even 
                                                            
 89. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, at 201–02 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 90. See generally TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34 (detailing the legal and 
political understanding of the privilege and suspension over the course of this period). 
 91. See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC 
DISORDERS 1789–1878, at 54–55 (1988); see also WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED 
AMERICA’S NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY 215 (2006). 
 92. COAKLEY, supra note 91, at 50; see also id. at 52 (recounting how Washington rejected the 
idea that the army would “bring offenders to a military tribunal” and instead promised that they would 
“merely aid the civil magistrates”) (quoting 4 JOHN C. FITZPATRICK, DIARIES OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, 216). 
 93. WILLIAM FINDLEY, HISTORY OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE FOUR WESTERN COUNTIES OF 
PENNSYLVANIA IN THE YEAR 1794, at 179 (Samuel Harrison Smith ed., 1796). 
 94. For additional details, see Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 
supra note 53, at 978. 
 95. See id. at 979–86 (detailing events). 
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of Confederate soldiers.96 Referring to the Suspension Clause, Lincoln wrote that 
the “provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the 
constitution that . . . [the] purpose” of suspension was so that “men may be held 
in custody whom the courts acting on ordinary rules, would discharge.”97 
Congress finally gave Lincoln the authority he had claimed for the first two 
years of the war by enacting suspension legislation in 1863, concurring in the 
President’s view that suspension was necessary to detain the disaffected outside 
the criminal process.98 Lincoln thereafter issued another sweeping suspension in 
September of 1863 specifically encompassing persons held in military custody 
as “prisoners of war.” By this term, he surely intended to include Confederate 
soldiers captured on the battlefield.99 
In the wake of the Civil War, suspension returned briefly during 
Reconstruction, when Congress authorized President Ulysses S. Grant to 
proclaim a suspension in order to combat the Ku Klux Klan in the South, which 
he did in 1871.100 Thereafter, it was not until World War II that suspension 
reemerged as part of public debates over how to detain the suspected disloyal 
during times of war. 
E. The Development of British Habeas Jurisprudence 
Meanwhile, in the wake of American independence, British habeas 
jurisprudence continued to embrace a suspension model grounded in the English 
Habeas Corpus Act. As had long been the case, this model contemplated that the 
detention outside the criminal process of those within protection—a category 
that included British citizens as well as aliens who could claim a temporary or 
local allegiance—could only follow under the terms of a suspension. But with 
the passage of time, British practice changed course in some respects, leading to 
significant differences between the British and American habeas jurisprudence. 
In order to understand the evolution of British habeas jurisprudence, one 
must recall that in Great Britain, there is no written Constitution. This is certainly 
                                                            
 96. See id. at 986–96; see also Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 
YALE L.J. 600, 637–51 (2009) [hereinafter Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power]. 
 97. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in 6 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 260, 264 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953) (internal 
citation omitted). Lincoln further explained the operation of the Suspension Clause as follows: “Habeas 
Corpus, does not discharge men who are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is 
allowed by the constitution on purpose that, men may be arrested and held, who can not be proved to be 
guilty of defined crime, ‘when, in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.’” Id. 
 98. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases 
of 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755. For more on the details of this legislation, consult Tyler, 
Suspension as an Emergency Power, supra note 96, at 637–55. 
 99. Proclamation No. 7, 13 Stat. 734, 734 (1863). Lincoln’s proclamation also encompassed 
those in the United States military, military deserters, and draft dodgers. 
 100.  See Ulysses S. Grant, A Proclamation (Nov. 10, 1871), reprinted in 9 A COMPILATION OF 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4090, 4091 (James D. Richardson ed., n.p., Bureau 
of Nat’l Literature 1897); Ulysses S. Grant, A Proclamation (Oct. 17, 1871), reprinted in id. at 4093, 
4095. 
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not to discount that such a thing as the British Constitution exists, but it is not a 
constitution in the American sense. Thus, in Britain, “Parliamentary sovereignty 
is a fundamental principle of the [unwritten] UK constitution,” a point recently 
reaffirmed by the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in its Brexit decision.101 
Indeed, Parliament possesses “the right to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever.”102 Because the Habeas Corpus Act was a parliamentary creation, it 
was always the case that Parliament could suspend the Act—as it did on many 
occasions—or even modify or repeal it through ordinary legislation. Until the 
twentieth century, when Parliament believed that the Habeas Corpus Act’s 
protections would obstruct the needs of national security, it turned to suspension. 
This practice culminated in suspensions applied to Ireland in 1866 and 1867.103 
But during the World Wars and later in 1971, Parliament charted a very 
different course. Its actions and the subsequent diminishing of the status of the 
Habeas Corpus Act laid the foundation for the more permanent changes that 
came in 1971, when Parliament fundamentally altered the core terms of the Act 
through regular legislation.104 
The impetus for these changes came from events surrounding the status of 
Ireland. Specifically, in response to the rise of Irish Republican Army and 
Loyalist violence, the British government declared a state of emergency and 
invoked the emergency powers provided for in the original laws governing the 
partition of Ireland in 1922.105 Then, in the Courts Act of 1971, Parliament went 
further and repealed what was originally the seventh section of the Habeas 
Corpus Act. In its place, Parliament adopted legislation authorizing the 
temporary preventive detention of suspected terrorists, thereby establishing the 
foundation of the legal framework that governs in the United Kingdom today.106 
Under this framework, the law permits the preventive or investigative detention 
of suspected terrorists, whether United Kingdom citizens or not, for up to 
fourteen days.107 
As noted, however, Parliament had already sidelined the Habeas Corpus 
Act during both World Wars. Never mind that the Act had once been deemed “a 
thing so sacred!” by its original supporters and a “second magna carta” by 
                                                            
 101.  R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 at para. 43. 
 102. Id. (quoting DICEY, supra note 21, at 38 (8th ed.)). 
 103. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 3. 
 104. See Courts Act 1971, c. 23, § 56(4), sch. 11, pt. IV (repealing 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 7). 
 105. Pursuant to those powers, the British government claimed the right to hold persons for a 
range of purposes and, in extreme cases, for an indefinite period upon an executive determination that 
internment was necessary “for securing the preservation of the peace and maintenance of order.” See 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 25, ¶¶ 81–84 (1978). 
 106. See Court Act 1971, c. 23, § 56(4) (Eng.). 
 107. See Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11 (Eng.), as amended, Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 c. 9 Pt 
4 § 57(1) (Eng.) (“In paragraph 36(3)(b)(ii) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (maximum period 
of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects) for ‘28 days’ substitute ‘14 days.’”). The governing 
statutory scheme affords persons detained on this basis multiple opportunities for judicial review as well 
as the opportunity to consult with and be represented by counsel. See id. 
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Blackstone.108 As A.W. Brian Simpson explained, “[t]he modern practice has 
been to pass legislation explicitly granting powers of detention in company with 
other emergency powers abridging civil liberty, and to attempt to exclude the 
regular courts from exercising any supervisory power over the executive.”109 
This is precisely what happened during both World Wars. Parliament’s actions 
during these periods functioned similarly to earlier suspensions, insofar as their 
effect was to repeal temporarily the protections of the Habeas Corpus Act.110 
During World War I, executive detention authority followed under 
Regulation 14B, issued under the auspices of the Defence of the Realm Act. In 
the 1914 Act, Parliament granted the executive extensive authority to “issue 
regulations for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm.”111 Issued 
in June of 1915, Regulation 14B expressly authorized the detention of British 
subjects of “hostile origin or associations,” and with its adoption, “the right to 
trial, if accused of disloyal conduct, [which] had hitherto been quite fundamental 
to the conception of a British citizen’s liberty” was extinguished for all those 
swept up within its framework.112 
                                          *          *          * 
Such was the backdrop for events that would transpire on both sides of the 
Atlantic during World War II. It is to those events to which the Article now turns. 
II. 
THE DETENTION OF BRITISH CITIZENS WITHOUT CRIMINAL CHARGES  
DURING WORLD WAR II 
In the face of the German threat and the looming Second World War, it did 
not take long for Parliament once again to grant the executive extensive wartime 
detention authority. 
A. Detentions Under Regulation 18B 
The events leading up to the internment of suspected enemies and the 
disloyal in Great Britain during World War II ran a similar course to those that 
                                                            
 108. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 133*; 9 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF 
COMMONS, supra note 53, at 131 (remarks of Sir Thomas Clarges); see id. at 268 (“We have had a 
struggle for [the Habeas Corpus Act] . . . and now, upon suggested Necessities, to dispense with this 
Law!”). 
 109. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 3. 
 110. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 230 
(9th ed. 1939). To be sure, there are important distinctions that may be drawn between the suspensions 
of the past and the approaches taken during the World Wars. The larger point, however, is that in both 
contexts, extensive detention outside the criminal process resulted. 
 111. Defence of the Realm (Consolidation Act) of 28 November 1914, 5 Geo. V, c. 8 (1914). 
 112. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 12, 14. For extensive details on Regulation 14B and its 
implementation, see id. at 12–33; see also id. at 12–13 (replicating Regulation’s terms). Among other 
things, Simpson noted that Regulation 14B ran for eight years, well past the formal end of the war, see 
id. at 5, and that it arose out of the delegation of authority by Parliament that resulted in the adoption of 
Regulation 14B through Orders in Council. Id. at 6. 
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unfolded in the United States. To begin, as in the United States, the first targets 
of emergency detention authority in Great Britain at the outset of the war were 
enemy aliens. The government initially planned to detain all enemy aliens. 
Instead, it interned some 28,000 of the approximately 70,000 enemy aliens 
present in Great Britain, an amount almost three times the nation’s the normal 
prison population during this period.113 
On the eve of the Battle of Britain, Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
sounded his enthusiasm for using any and all government powers to stamp out 
Fifth Column activities.114 This included exercising the power to detain allegedly 
subversive citizens. As he stated in June of 1940: 
We have found it necessary to take measures of increasing stringency, 
not only against enemy aliens and suspicious characters of other 
nationalities, but also against British subjects who may become a danger 
or a nuisance should the war be transported to the United Kingdom. I 
know there are a great many people affected by the orders which we 
have made who are the passionate enemies of Nazi Germany. I am very 
sorry for them, but we cannot, at the present time and under the present 
stress, draw all the distinctions which we should like to do . . . . There 
is, however, another class for which I feel not the slightest sympathy. 
Parliament has given us the power to put down Fifth Column activities 
with a strong hand, and we shall use those powers, subject to the 
supervision and correction of the House, without the slightest hesitation 
until we are satisfied and more than satisfied that this malignancy in our 
midst has been effectively stamped out.115 
Specifically, Churchill referenced the expanded powers that Parliament had 
vested in the executive to “make provision . . . for the detention of persons whose 
detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of the 
public safety of the defence of the realm.”116 
Under the auspices of the 1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, the Privy 
Council adopted Regulation 18B, initially in secret.117 Regulation 18B in turn set 
in motion the detention policies that governed British citizens suspected of being 
                                                            
 113. For details, see GILLMAN & GILLMAN, supra note 19, at 5, 222 (estimating the number 
detained at 27,200 and noting that many were deported); SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 51–53, 163; see 
also GILLMAN & GILLMAN, supra note 19 (noting that Britain detained almost 30,000 foreigners during 
World War II). The power to detain enemy aliens followed under the royal prerogative. See SIMPSON, 
supra note 17, at 12, 52. 
 114. A so-called Fifth Column refers to a group of people who work to undermine a larger group 
of which they are a part. In this case, the reference applied to those believed to be supporting Germany 
and undermining the British war effort from within. 
 115. Parliamentary Debates, HC Vol. 361 c. 787–96 (statement of Prime Minister Churchill, June 
4, 1940), in SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 163–64. 
 116. Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62, 1(2)(a) (1939). 
 117. For a detailed explication of the procedures by which 18B became law, consult SIMPSON, 
supra note 17, at 44–50. 
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under foreign influence or control or otherwise associated with and sympathetic 
to any power with which Great Britain was at war.118 
In the Defence Act, Parliament reserved its authority to reject regulations 
issued under its auspices, and Parliament did so with respect to the initial version 
of Regulation 18B.119 This spurred the adoption of an amended version of 
Regulation 18B, which provided: 
If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe any person to 
be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently concerned 
in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm or in 
the preparation or instigation of such acts and that by reason thereof it 
is necessary to exercise control over him, he may make an order against 
that person directing that he be detained.120 
The regulations adopted under the Defence Act also encompassed internal 
checks on the government’s detention practices. To begin, Regulation 18B called 
for the establishment of an Advisory Committee to hear challenges to detention 
orders as Regulation 18B came to be implemented.121 Regulation 18B further 
required that such committee “inform [an] objector of the grounds on which the 
order has been made against him and . . . furnish him with such particulars as are 
in the opinion of the chairman sufficient to enable him to present his case.”122 
Once the Advisory Committee had established four panels, a substantial number 
of those detained pursued relief before them.123 It was not long before the panels 
quickly faced a backlog of cases.124 
Regulation 18B also required the Home Secretary to deliver monthly 
reports to Parliament detailing the actions that he had taken under Regulation 
18B’s authority.125 This the Home Secretary did on various occasions, including 
once in the fall of 1941, when the he appeared before the Commons to “explain[] 
in the greatest detail his use of the powers in a particular case.”126 
                                                            
 118. For details, see id. 
 119. See Herman Finer, The British Cabinet, The House of Commons and the War, 56 Pol. Sci. 
Q. 321, 355 (1941). 
 120. Defence Regulations 1939, Stat. R & O 1681, at 18B (Eng.). This version of Regulation 18B 
went into effect on November 23, 1939. 
 121. Id. 18B(3). 
 122. Id. 18B(5). 
 123. War Cabinet, Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Custody of Persons Detained under 
Defence Regulation 18B,” at 1–2 (July 20, 1940) TNA CAB 66/10/4 (noting that “most” of the 600 men 
then in custody “have made objections” to the Advisory Committee and that each panel was “under the 
Chairmanship of an experienced barrister”). 
 124. See Cornelius P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British Experience, 6 STAN. 
L. REV. 238, 265–74 (1954). Great Britain also established tribunals for reviewing the cases of enemy 
aliens taken into custody. For details, consult GILLMAN & GILLMAN, supra note 19, at 42–46 (noting 
that early on these tribunals recommended internment in a very small percentage of cases). 
 125.  Defence Regulations 1939, Stat. R & O 1681, at 18B(6) (Eng.). 
 126. Speech of Prime Minister Winston Churchill to the House of Commons (Oct. 21, 1941), in 
VI WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897–1963, at 6497 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 
1974). 
816 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  107:789 
Notably, the original version of Regulation 18B had given the Home 
Secretary a virtual blank check in terms of deciding who to detain, permitting 
him to issue a detention order “if satisfied, with respect to any particular person, 
that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
public safety or the Defence of the Realm, it is necessary to do so.”127 The 
amended version of Regulation 18B came about in the wake of strong reaction 
in Parliament to the virtually unbounded authority that the original version had 
vested in the Home Secretary.128 Nonetheless, this significant development in 
the evolution of Regulation 18B wielded little influence on the manner in which 
the British courts later adjudicated challenges brought against 18B detentions. 
In May of 1940, Parliament again amended Regulation 18B in order to 
reach those who were, or had ever been, members or allies of various subversive 
organizations.129 The new version of Regulation 18B specifically targeted 
organizations that were “subject to foreign influence or control” and those 
organizations under the influence of “persons [who] have or have had 
associations with persons concerned in the government of, or sympathies with 
the system of government of, any Power with which His Majesty is at war,” 
where there was a “danger of the utilization of the organization for purposes 
prejudicial to the public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of 
public order,” or more generally the war effort.130 The newly amended 
Regulation was intended to be—and served as a basis for—an expansion of the 
Regulation 18B detention program.131 
The Home Office wasted little time in arresting hundreds of suspected 
individuals, moving quickly in the wake of the adoption of Regulation 18B.132 
Those detained famously included a member of Parliament,133 as well as two of 
Prime Minister Churchill’s cousins by marriage.134 (As is explored in Part IV, 
                                                            
 127. See Defense Regulations 1939, Stat. R. & O. 978 (amending Stat. R. & O 927). The original 
version of Regulation 18B went into effect on September 1, 1939, the day Germany invaded Poland. 
 128. See Lord Bingham of Cornhill, The Case of Liversidge v. Anderson: The Rule of Law Amid 
the Clash of Arms, 43 INT’L LAW. 33, 34 (2009). As one set of chroniclers of the period noted, “[t]he 
police liked 18B” in its original version, “[b]ut the government found that it had misjudged the readiness 
of Parliament to confer such sweeping powers on the executive, even in war.” GILLMAN & GILLMAN, 
supra note 19, at 121. Thus, “[t]here were vehement protests, and after consulting MPs of all parties, the 
Home Office modified Regulation 18B considerably.” Id. 
 129. Defence Regulations 1940, Stat. R. & O. 770. This version of 18B went into effect on May 
22, 1940. 
 130. Id. 
 131. For details, see SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 172–74. 
 132. See id. at 163–91. 
 133. See ANDREW ROBERTS, CHURCHILL: WALKING WITH DESTINY 538 (2018) (noting that the 
government took Archibald Maule Ramsay, a Conservative MP, into custody shortly after Regulation 
18B went into effect);War Cabinet, Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Members of the British 
Union Detained Under Regulation 18B,” at 2 (Sept. 7, 1944) TNA CAB 66/55/5 (discussing the case of 
Captain Ramsay, M.P., who was detained under 18B) (on file with author). 
 134. See ROBERTS, supra note 133, at 538 (noting that the government took Diana Mosley and 
George Pitt-Rivers into custody shortly after Regulation 18B went into effect and that the two were 
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this highlights the fact that those swept up in the detentions included persons 
who were not ethnically or socially removed from those in power.135) With the 
expansion of Regulation 18B in May of 1940, 18B detention orders primarily 
targeted members of the British Union of Fascists, but others as well.136 In 
particular, the Home Secretary reported in November 1941 that his office had 
wielded Regulation 18B to detain “members of the I.R.A., persons who have 
obtained or tried to obtain secret information, persons who have tried or planned 
to get in touch with the enemy, persons who have committed or planned acts of 
sabotage, persons who have tried to slow down production, and so on.”137 He 
also reported that all such persons “are believed to have been guilty of 
committing or preparing to commit criminal offences, though criminal 
proceedings are impracticable or for some substantial reason inexpedient.”138 
In total, the Home Office executed at least 1,800 detention orders against 
British citizens.139 Still more “were detained abroad in British dependencies 
under local versions of the regulations, and moved to Britain under Regulation 
18A.”140 Detentions reached their height in the summer of 1940 after the 
expanded version of Regulation 18B went into effect and when, according to a 
later report of the Home Secretary, the government had increased the number of 
detainees “by some 1,300 people.”141 With each year that the war continued, 
however, the number of detainees dropped precipitously, falling to under one 
                                                            
cousins of Churchill’s wife Clementine, a fact that reportedly “piqued” the Prime Minister) (quoting 
Churchill’s Secretary John Colville); SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 217. 
 135.  Indeed, for a time, Churchill received weekly lists of so-called “Prominent Persons” 
detained under Regulation 18B. See SIMPSON supra note 17, at 214–15. And as A.W. Brian Simpson 
noted, “[t]he appearance of [his] two cousins in the Home Office lists may have brought home to 
Churchill the reality of the action he had supported.” Id. at 218. 
 136. See generally id.; see also War Cabinet, Memorandum of the Home Secretary, “Should 
Detention Orders be Made Under Defence Regulation 18B Against Certain Persons Carrying on 
Prejudicial Propaganda,” at 1 (Nov. 14, 1941) TNA CAB 66/19/40 (noting that “[m]ost of the persons 
who have been detained under [Regulation 18B] are persons connected with the British Union or persons 
of hostile origin or associations”) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Should Detention Orders be Made 
Under Defence Regulation 18B”]. 
 137. “Should Detention Orders be Made Under Defence Regulation 18B,” supra note 136, at 1–
2. 
 138. Id. at 1–2. The Home Secretary also declared that “[t]he general principle which the Home 
Office follows is that, if . . . criminal proceedings can be taken, they should be taken, and that only if 
there are good reasons against a prosecution should use be made of the power to detain by administrative 
order . . . .” Id. at 1. 
 139. For details of the experience of detention, see SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 230–57. 
 140. Id. at 222. 
 141. War Cabinet, Memorandum of the Home Secretary, “Accommodation for Married Couples 
Detained Under Defence Regulation 18B,” at 1 (Nov. 21, 1941) TNA CAB 66/20/1 (on file with author). 
The same report noted that “[d]uring the first nine months of the war, all persons detained under 
[Regulation 18B] were accommodated in prison establishments because this was the only 
accommodation available.” But because the government policy was that “detention of such persons is 
preventive and custodial in character, and not in any way punitive,” the Home Office moved to establish 
special camps for the detainees. Id. Eventually, by the summer of 1941, “the bulk of the persons detained 
under the Regulation were transferred to the Isle of Man,” where they lived in two camps. Id. 
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hundred by 1944.142 This followed for many reasons, including the reassessment 
of existing cases by MI5 and the Home Office.143 It was only due to an Order in 
Council that Regulation 18B lapsed on the day following VE Day.144 As is 
discussed below, the declining use of Regulation 18B corresponded in large 
measure with Prime Minister Churchill’s change of heart with respect to the 
detention program. 
B. Challenging 18B Detentions Before the Advisory Committee and the 
Courts 
Under Regulation 18B, the Home Office bore a responsibility to constitute 
advisory panels to review the basis of detention orders, which the Home 
Secretary did soon after Regulation 18B went into effect. As the arrests mounted, 
those detained turned first to challenge their arrests before the Committee. In 
time, others sought refuge in the British courts. Although some of those detained 
successfully challenged their detentions before the Advisory Committee, just as 
during World War I,145 litigants found little success in the courts.146 
To begin, the Advisory Committee faced major backlogs in 1940, even 
though the Home Office had established four panels to review cases.147 Despite 
the delays, evidence suggests that at times the Advisory Committee exercised its 
responsibility with some care. For example, it held four days of hearings in Sir 
Oswald Mosley’s case.148 This being said, in most cases, reports suggest that the 
                                                            
 142. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 221–22; see also id. at 381 (giving year-by-year statistics of 
drastically declining numbers). Simpson notes that by the end of April 1945, only eleven detainees 
remained in custody under the 18B framework, as contrasted with the over one thousand in custody in 
December 1940. See id. at 222. In a September 1944 Memorandum, the Home Secretary reported that 
the total number of persons detained for being associated with the British Union during the war was 747, 
that the number of members in custody in April 1943 had fallen to 130, and that by September 1944, the 
number had fallen to only fifteen. See Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Members of the British 
Union Detained Under Regulation 18B,” supra note 133, at 1. 
 143. For details, see SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 383–88. 
 144. See id. at 408. Victory in Europe Day occurred on May 8, 1945. 
 145. See King v. Halliday, [1917] AC 260 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (upholding detention 
of a naturalized British subject without charges pursuant to Regulation 14B of the Defence of the Realm 
Regulations, 1914). 
 146. Only one litigant successfully won his release by court order. The victory, however, was 
short lived, as he was arrested anew one week later. See A.W.B. Simpson, Rhetoric, Reality, and 
Regulation 18B, 3 DENNING L.J. 123, 125 (1988). 
 147. Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Custody of Persons Detained under Defence 
Regulation 18B,” supra note 123, at 1–2. For extensive details on the establishment and structure of the 
Advisory Committee, see SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 82–94; 261–67. On the backlogs, see id. at 261–
65. 
 148. To be sure, the Advisory Committee adjourned Mosley’s hearing in the middle so that the 
government could shore up its case. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 276–80 (detailing the extended 
hearings). Mosley’s case, which was extremely high profile within the Home Office, garnered intense 
scrutiny from Parliament and the press. See, e.g., Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Custody of 
Persons Detained under Defence Regulation 18B,” supra note 123, at 1 (highlighting Mosley’s case). A 
former member of Parliament, Mosley was the leader of the British Union of Fascists and taken into 
custody during a wave of arrests in May 1940. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 113, 117–19. 
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hearings were brief and mainly comprised of interrogations of the detainees.149 
Either way, the Advisory Committee recommended the release of a substantial 
number of interned persons.150 But although the Home Secretary acknowledged 
in the summer of 1940 “the possibility that some mistakes may have been made” 
in ordering detentions under Regulation 18B,151 he retained the authority to 
disregard the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, as he did on several 
occasions.152 
In the courts, the cases of Robert Liversidge and Ben Greene most 
prominently challenged detention orders during the war. Both cases reached the 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary that sat in the House of Lords, otherwise known as 
the Law Lords.153 Here, the fact that Regulation 18B had been amended from its 
original form, arguably to impose constraints upon the Home Secretary, raised 
important questions as to whether the courts might enforce such limits and 
second-guess certain detention orders. In time, however, the Law Lords decided 
against such a course. 
Liversidge’s case reached the Law Lords in the fall of 1941 at a particularly 
“low point” in the war—when “[n]ight after night London and other cities were 
being severely bombed.”154 Adding to the drama of the case, the Lords delivered 
                                                            
 149. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 89–92. Further, proceedings before the Advisory Committee 
were informal and detainees were not permitted to question witnesses, nor were they generally permitted 
counsel at their hearings. See id. 
 150. For example, in one batch of cases reviewed by the Advisory Committee, it recommended 
release in 199 out of the 317 cases. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 293. MI5 disagreed with the 
recommendation of release in 111 of these same cases, see id., highlighting the longstanding tension 
between the Home Office and MI5 on how broadly to exercise the 18B authority. For greater detail on 
this tension, consult generally id.; see also A.W. Brian Simpson, Detention without Trial in the Second 
World War: Comparing the British and American Experiences, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 225, 241–42 
(1988) (noting that the Home Secretary was more inclined to accept recommendations of the Advisory 
Committee earlier in the war). 
 151. Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Custody of Persons Detained under Defence 
Regulation 18B,” supra note 123, at 2. 
 152. See Note, Civil Liberties in Great Britain and Canada during War, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1006, 
1014–15 (1942). The Home Secretary did not, however, overrule the Advisory Committee’s 
recommendation that Lady Domvile be released. See Memorandum of the Home Secretary, 
“Accommodation for Married Couples Detained Under Defence Regulation 18B,” supra note 141, at 3. 
Further, in September 1944, the Home Secretary urged that all remaining cases involving the detention 
of British Union members be reviewed for potential release in the course of one to two months. See 
Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Members of the British Union Detained Under Regulation 
18B,” supra note 133, at 1–2. At the same time, the Home Secretary also recommended the release of 
Captain Ramsay, the Member of Parliament who had been detained under Regulation 18B. See id. at 2. 
 153. Of both cases, A.W. Brian Simpson asserted that the individuals “were entirely loyal.” 
SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 226. Notably, both were released shortly after the Law Lords issued their 
opinions in the two cases. Several other individuals filed cases in the British courts during the war 
challenging 18B detentions. See id. at 353–80 (providing details). Liversidge had changed his name 
from Jack Perlzweig. He was serving as a volunteer Pilot Officer in the Royal Air Force at the time of 
his arrest. See Bingham, supra note 128, at 34. 
 154. Bingham, supra note 128, at 35 (quoting Lord Bingham). As Lord Bingham also noted, this 
period witnessed Adolf Hitler’s expanding victories on the continent and the impending collapse of the 
Empire in the Far East. See id. 
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their eventual opinions in the case in the King’s Robing Room rather than the 
Commons, which had been destroyed by German bombs.155 
Liversidge had brought an action against the Secretary for false 
imprisonment. He argued that the court should require the Secretary to disclose 
the “particulars” of his “reasonable belief” that Liversidge qualified for 
detention, and more generally that his detention was unlawful and the 
government should pay him damages for false imprisonment. In response, the 
government argued first that under the regulatory scheme, a court could not order 
the Home Secretary “to give particulars,” and second that “[w]hen a man is 
detained in pursuance of this regulation, he is deemed to be in lawful custody.”156 
To resolve the matter, four of the five Law Lords employed a subjective 
test, holding that the Home Secretary’s belief that he had reasonable cause for 
suspecting Liversidge of hostile origins or association sufficed.157 In so doing, 
the majority rejected an objective test that arguably would have called upon the 
courts to second-guess the Home Secretary’s actions in some cases.158 In other 
words, the court’s decision declined to review the Home Secretary’s exercise of 
discretion in any manner. It was at least partially pertinent to the majority’s view 
that the Home Office likely made detention decisions based upon confidential 
information. But as one Law Lord wrote, the majority broadly subscribed to the 
view that “this is . . . clearly a matter for executive discretion and nothing 
else.”159 
But the majority’s position did not go unchallenged. In a now-famous 
dissenting opinion, Lord James Richard Atkin struck a very different chord. 
Specifically, Atkin argued that the term “reasonably,” as used throughout the 
common and statutory law, was almost always understood in an objective sense. 
As he put it, “‘[r]easonable cause’ for an action or belief is just as much a positive 
fact capable of determination by a third party as is a broken ankle or a legal 
right.”160 It followed, in his view, that there was some role for the courts to play 
in scrutinizing the Secretary’s asserted basis for detentions under Regulation 
18B. Notably, there is evidence to support both sides of the argument over 
whether Parliament desired judicial enforcement of the added “reasonable cause” 
language in the amended Regulation,161 but earlier in the war, the Attorney 
                                                            
 155. See Bingham, supra note 128, at 35. 
 156. Liversidge v. Anderson and Morrison, [1941] 2 All. ER 612, 612–13 (C.A.). Liversidge was 
represented by a fellow detainee who had been earlier released. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 215. 
 157. See Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] AC 206 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. at 220–21 (opinion of Viscount Maugham). 
 160. Id. at 227–28; see also id. at 228 (“[T]his meaning of the words has been accepted in 
innumerable legal decisions for many generations; that ‘reasonable cause’ for a belief when the subject 
of legal dispute had been always treated as an objective fact to be proved by one or other party and to 
be determined by the appropriate tribunal.”). 
 161. A.W. Brian Simpson reported that “Home Office papers from 1941 emphasize that everyone 
involved in the consultations, especially the lawyers, realized that although the new regulation would 
limit the Home Secretary’s powers, it was never intended that the judges might review detention orders 
ion their merits, though they might be ready to interfere in extreme cases of abuse of power.” SIMPSON, 
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General had opined that a separate category of alleged abuses of the 18B 
detention power likely would be subject to judicial review and rebuke.162 An 
argument could be made, therefore, that the government would hardly have been 
blindsided by judicial enforcement of Regulation 18B’s terms. 
More generally, Atkin wrote—in words eerily similar to those used by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte Milligan just after the Civil 
War163—that “[i]n this country, amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. 
They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace.”164 
He continued: 
It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of 
liberty for which on recent authority we are now fighting, that the judges 
are no respecters of persons and stand between the subject and any 
attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that 
any coercive action is justified in law. In this case I have listened to 
arguments which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of 
King’s Bench in the time of Charles I.165 
Lord Atkin knew his history, for here he referred to the unstable period of 
Charles I’s reign that preceded the English Civil War and enactment of the 
English Habeas Corpus Act, when Charles I successfully defended detentions 
predicated upon royal command alone and the courts generally deferred to 
executive fiat.166 Lord Atkin invoked Charles I’s reign, of course, to underscore 
the point that the English judiciary came to play a far more robust role in 
checking executive detention later in the seventeenth century following adoption 
of the English Habeas Corpus Act.167 
Unsurprisingly, the Liversidge case received extensive coverage in the 
press. The decision was so controversial that the author of the lead majority 
opinion penned a letter to the press following delivery of the case defending and 
                                                            
supra note 17, at 65. He also reported, however, that some members of Parliament involved in the lead-
up to the amendments claimed later that the new language was intended to give an aggrieved individual 
“the right to go to the High Court and challenge the Minister’s action, and it is then incumbent on the 
Minister to prove to the court that he has indeed and in fact acted reasonably.” Id. 
 162. See Memorandum of the Home Secretary, “Should Detention Orders be Made Under 
Defence Regulation 18B Against Certain Persons Carrying on Prejudicial Propaganda,” supra note 135 
(appending “Note by the Attorney-General”) (“If action was taken in [a] case [involving one taken into 
custody based solely on propaganda], and the man sought to challenge it by habeas corpus proceedings, 
his line would be that the acts . . . were not ‘acts prejudicial’ within the meaning of Regulation 18B. If 
he could satisfy the Court on this point I think he might well make out his claim.”). 
 163. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866) (“The Constitution of the United 
States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its 
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”). 
 164. See Liversidge, AC 206 at 244. Justice Stephen Breyer recently relied upon this passage in 
a dissenting opinion. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1885 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 165. Liversidge, AC 206 at 244. During the reign of Charles I, which preceded the eventual 
adoption of the English Habeas Corpus Act, royal command generally sufficed to sustain a detention. 
See Tyler, A Second Magna Carta, supra note 40, at 1955. 
 166. For details, see TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34, at 13–31. 
 167. For details and many examples, see id. at 13–61. 
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explaining the judgment.168 Meanwhile, many papers wrote critically of the Law 
Lords’ decision. The Manchester Guardian was among those attacking the 
decision, writing that the decision “leaves it clear that the Law Lords have pretty 
well washed their hands of any concern in the exercise of Defence Regulation 
18B . . . , ‘provided only that [the Home Secretary] acts in good faith.’” In other 
words, the paper wrote, “the field is left to him, and to him alone.”169 
Defenders of the decision emerged as well. They included the London 
Times, which came out strongly in support of the decision, writing that “any 
Judge who ordered the release of a prisoner in disregard of the Home Secretary’s 
opinion that he was dangerous would in fact be assuming a responsibility in the 
sphere of national defence which can be borne only by the Executive officer 
answerable to Parliament.”170 Even today, some modern commentators have 
similarly criticized Lord Atkin’s dissent for “fail[ing] to explain . . . at all how 
the supervisory role of the courts was to operate, granted the right, which he 
conceded, to withhold information of a confidential character.”171 
On the same day as they decided Liversidge, the Law Lords also rejected a 
habeas corpus challenge brought in the Greene case. There, the majority held 
that the relevant detention order alone sufficed to sustain Greene’s 
imprisonment. Under the majority view, this meant that it would be rare, if ever, 
that the Home Secretary would be required to submit an affidavit justifying a 
particular detention.172 This decision further cemented the reality that any 
oversight of 18B detentions would have to come from Parliament rather than the 
courts. Indeed, what little there was during the war came from that source.173 
Perhaps it is not surprising that the courts stayed their hands in the face of 
Regulation 18B detention challenges. After all, many cases came before the Law 
Lords during the fall of 1941, which was an especially precarious point in the 
war for Great Britain. More generally, as the Solicitor General once wrote, one 
could view Regulation 18B as effectively constituting a suspension of habeas 
corpus, which had always been understood to preclude judicial review.174 On this 
score, as noted earlier, the right to habeas corpus in the British tradition was (and 
remains) not grounded in any written constitution, but instead existed at the 
                                                            
 168. See G.W. Keeton, Liversidge v. Anderson, 5 MOD. L. REV. 162, 162 (1942); see also 
Bingham, supra note 128, at 37. 
 169. Regulation 18B, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Nov. 4, 1941, at 4, ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer. 
 170. War and Habeas Corpus, LONDON TIMES, Nov. 4, 1941, p. 5, col. 3., The Times Digital 
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 171. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 363. 
 172. Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] AC 284 (HL). 
 173. See Cotter, supra note 124, at 274–85 (surveying parliamentary debates and noting that the 
Question Period was used repeatedly to seek information from the Home Office); SIMPSON, supra note 
17, at 414 (noting that the secrecy of Regulation 18B’s implementation undermined the Commons’ 
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 174. See WILLIAM JOWITT, SOME WERE SPIES 15–16 (1954). 
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mercy of Parliament’s power to suspend it. Thus, a different version of 
Liversidge could have construed Regulation 18B along the same lines as the 
Solicitor General—namely, as a suspension of the privilege. 
Over time, however, Lord Atkin’s dissent has garnered considerable 
support such that in 1980 one leading member of the House of Lords proclaimed 
that “the time has come to acknowledge openly that the majority of this House 
in Liversidge v. Anderson were expediently and, at that time, perhaps, excusably 
wrong and the dissenting speech of Lord Atkin was right.”175 Additional 
discussion of Liversidge and the role of the judiciary in reviewing wartime 
detentions follows below. 
C. The Prime Minister Becomes a Critic 
At the outset of the war, Prime Minister Churchill had been a strong 
supporter of aggressive tactics—including internment—directed at individuals 
suspected of Fifth Column activities. During debates over how to address the 
problem of alien enemies present in Great Britain, Churchill reportedly declared 
“Collar the lot!”176 His support for large-scale internment of alien enemies in the 
absence of meaningful individual review as well as his support for their 
deportation—with at times tragic consequences—does not stand among his 
better legacies.177 
But in the face of broad public support for the 18B program and against the 
backdrop of his original support for the same, it is significant that over the course 
of the war, Churchill became an increasingly staunch critic of Regulation 18B 
and its provision for the detention of citizens outside the criminal process. 
Indeed, by the fall of 1943, Churchill was celebrating “the great principle of 
habeas corpus and trial by jury, which are the supreme protection invented by 
the British people for ordinary individuals against the State.”178 Notably, in 
equating the concepts of habeas corpus and trial by jury, Churchill appeared to 
have fully appreciated the historic link between the concepts forged in the 
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. Churchill’s later speeches and writings, 
moreover, reveal that he fully appreciated the significance of the Habeas Corpus 
                                                            
 175. Bingham, supra note 128, at 38. 
 176.  GILLMAN & GILLMAN, supra note 19, at 153 (quoting Churchill). 
 177. Id. at 133, 219 (noting that Churchill spoke in favor of the removal of alien enemy internees 
out of the United Kingdom in an important meeting); see also id. at 185–201 (detailing the sinking of 
one ship full of internees being deported); id. at 225 (noting that, during the war, 7,350 internees were 
deported and 650 drowned). Early in the war, the War Department also debated deporting citizen 
detainees. See Memorandum by the Home Secretary, “Custody of Persons Detained under Defence 
Regulation 18B,” supra note 123, at 2–3. 
 178. Cable from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Home Secretary Herbert Morrison (Nov. 
21, 1943), in 5 CHURCHILL, supra note 1 at 679. Earlier in the war, Churchill declared in a speech to the 
House of Commons that “‘Habeas Corpus,’ ‘petitioner’s right,’ ‘charges made which are known to the 
law,’ and ‘trial by jury’” are “all . . . a part of what we are fighting to preserve.” Speech of Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill to the House of Commons (Oct. 21, 1941), in VI CHURCHILL, supra note 126, at 
6497. 
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Act in the story of the privilege. In his famous Iron Curtain speech given in the 
immediate wake of the war, for example, Churchill declared: 
[W]e must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles 
of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the 
English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of 
Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law 
find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of 
Independence.179 
Ten years later, in 1956, Churchill specifically lauded as a “monument” the 
“Habeas Corpus Act which confirmed and strengthened the freedom of the 
individual against arbitrary arrest by the executive.” Because of the Act, he 
continued, “wherever the English language is spoken in any part of the world, 
wherever the authority of the British Imperial Crown or of the Government of 
the United States prevails, all law-abiding men breathe freely.”180 
To be sure, in the fall of 1943, Churchill still defended some executive 
detention outside the criminal process, arguing that “when extreme danger to the 
State can be pleaded . . . this power may be temporarily assumed by the 
Executive.”181 But he cautioned that this state of affairs was appropriate “only” 
when such danger existed, and, even then, “its working must be interpreted with 
the utmost vigilance by a Free Parliament.”182 
Churchill’s change of course on the wisdom of Regulation 18B nonetheless 
begun much earlier in the war. In fact, even as early as the fall of 1940, Churchill 
conveyed “increasing scepticism [sic]” to the House of Commons about the need 
for executive detention powers granted by Regulation 18B.183 Churchill’s 
evolving views were consistent with his views held during his time in the 
Colonial Office decades earlier, when he had written on the evils of detention 
without trial and taken a keen interest in habeas corpus matters.184 This being 
said, his early interventions in 18B cases were aimed solely at easing the 
circumstances of detention, rather than ending it outright.185 
In correspondence written near the end of 1940, Churchill explained his 
concerns relating to the dramatic executive powers bestowed under Regulation 
18B: 
                                                            
 179.  Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, Address at Westminster College (Mar. 5, 1946), 
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 185. See SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 249. Early in the administration of Regulation 18B, 
Churchill angrily complained about the extended period of time that detainees were imprisoned rather 
than interned. He also argued for permitting married couples to live together. See id. 
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Having been brought up on the Bill of Rights, habeas corpus, and trial 
by jury conceptions, I grieved to become responsible, even with the 
constant assent of Parliament, for their breach. In June, July, August, 
and September our plight had seemed so grievous that no limits could 
be put upon the action of the State. Now that we had for the time being 
got our heads again above water, a further refinement in the treatment 
of internes seemed obligatory.186 
Echoing these themes, in October 1941, Churchill gave a speech to the 
House of Commons in which he stated that: 
There is no part of the powers conferred on [the executive] in this time 
of trial that I view with greater repugnance than these powers of 
exceptional process against the liberty of the subject without the 
ordinary safeguards which are inherent in British life . . . all [of which] 
are part of what we are fighting to preserve.187 
Such powers, Churchill opined, should never be invoked except for “self-
preservation” of the state.188 And, by the end of 1941, Churchill declared that the 
powers vested in the executive by Regulation 18B should “be abandoned as soon 
as possible.”189 
In 1943, Churchill turned completely against Regulation 18B, admonishing 
in a now-famous passage that “[t]he power of the Executive to cast a man into 
prison without formulating any charge known to the law, and particularly to deny 
him the judgement of his peers, is in the highest degree odious and is the 
foundation of all totalitarian government.”190 Thus, Churchill now urged the 
repeal of Regulation 18B, counseling “strongly” that “such powers . . . are 
contrary to the whole spirit of British public life and British history.”191 As he 
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wrote to his wife Clementine during this period: “I am burning to take part in the 
debate on 18B, and if I were at home now I would blow the whole blasted thing 
out of existence.”192 
At the time, Churchill recognized that his position went against the tide of 
popular and political support for the government’s detention policies,193 but he 
nevertheless urged his Home Secretary to promote the repeal of Regulation 18B. 
In a powerful letter, Churchill advised him that “[p]eople who are not prepared 
to do unpopular things and to defy clamour are not fit to be Ministers in times of 
stress.”194 Finally, in a passage that underscores Churchill’s contemporary 
recognition of the historical precedent that his administration was establishing, 
he counseled the Home Secretary that “[a]ny unpopularity you have incurred 
through correct and humane exercise of your functions will be repaid in a few 
months by public respect.”195 
As will be discussed below, Churchill’s approach to such matters stands in 
considerable tension with that of his American counterpart. 
III. 
THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE: SUSPENSION AND MARTIAL LAW IN 
THE HAWAIIAN TERRITORY, EXCLUSION ORDERS AND INTERNMENT CAMPS 
ON THE MAINLAND 
Across the Atlantic, the United States also witnessed the detention of 
citizens during World War II. It did not take long once the country entered the 
war. 
Everything began with the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. 
Congress declared war on Japan the next day and on Germany three days after 
that.196 The bombing also set off a dramatic chain of events in both the Hawaiian 
Territory and on the mainland. In its immediate wake, suspension and martial 
law came to rule in Hawaii. Meanwhile, over the next few months, on the West 
Coast of the mainland the military imposed curfews, designated huge military 
areas of exclusion, and ultimately created “relocation centers” throughout the 
region. Altogether, these efforts sought to control the movements of, and in time 
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involuntarily intern, approximately 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry.197 
Those interned under military orders during this period included over 70,000 
United States citizens.198 
The government’s response to Pearl Harbor was swift and extensive, 
initially focusing on circumstances in the Hawaiian Territory and alien enemies 
throughout the United States. As to the latter, within twenty-four hours of the 
bombing, President Roosevelt had issued proclamations designating Japanese, 
German, and Italian citizens inside the United States to be “alien enemies” and 
subjecting those “deemed dangerous to the public peace or safety of the United 
States” to “summary apprehension.”199 In the days that followed, the government 
arrested hundreds of aliens.200 By February 1942, almost three thousand 
Japanese aliens had been detained on the mainland and in the Hawaiian Territory 
under this authority.201 
A. The Hawaiian Territory 
In Hawaii, meanwhile, the military quickly took control of the territory and 
declared a suspension and martial law, a state of affairs that lasted through much 
of the war. In the years that followed, the policies that unfolded in Hawaii pushed 
the boundaries of Suspension Clause jurisprudence and revisited the Civil War 
debates over the scope of martial law and the propriety of military trials of 
civilians. 
In the hours following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian Territorial 
Governor Joseph Poindexter declared martial law and suspended the privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus in the Territory “until further notice.”202 Poindexter 
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claimed the authority to do so under the Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, which 
gave the territorial governor standing authority to suspend the privilege “in case 
of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety 
requires it.”203 The Hawaiian Organic Act also granted the governor authority to 
“place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial law.”204 Further, any 
suspension or declaration of martial law would remain in effect “until 
communication [could] be had with the President and his decision thereon made 
known.”205 President Roosevelt quickly approved the governor’s actions.206 
Following the governor’s proclamation, the military took over all 
governmental affairs in Hawaii, including the courts.207 “Trial by jury and 
indictment by grand jury were abolished,”208 and military tribunals held all 
criminal trials, continuing to do so even after civilian courts reopened to hear 
most other matters.209 Under the suspension, “suspected citizens were rounded 
up and placed in a local inter[n]ment camp,” without formal hearings and without 
charges.210 As the Supreme Court noted in its post-war decision, Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku: 
The military undoubtedly assumed that its rule was not subject to any 
judicial control whatever, for by orders issued on August 25, 1943, it 
prohibited even accepting of a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a 
judge or judicial employee or the filing of such a petition by a prisoner 
or his attorney.211 
Earlier military orders similarly prohibited courts from reviewing habeas 
petitions.212 
Nonetheless, the United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii 
decided several notable habeas cases during the war. Two categories of 
                                                            
 203. Ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141, 153. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. For more details, consult Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307–08 (1946) and 
Anthony, supra note 202. 
 206. See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 308 & n.2; id. at 348 (Burton, J., dissenting); Anthony, supra note 
202, at 478 (detailing communications between Poindexter and Roosevelt). 
 207. See Anthony, supra note 202, at 481. 
 208. Id. Garner Anthony served as Attorney General of Hawaii during the war; he later 
challenged the validity of martial law in Hawaii before the Supreme Court in the Duncan case, detailed 
below. 
 209. As the Ninth Circuit noted during this period, “because of the prohibition against the 
assembling or empaneling of juries [the courts] were wholly disabled from trying criminal cases in the 
constitutional sense.” Ex parte Duncan, 146 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1944). 
 210. See Anthony, supra note 202, at 503 (noting that the hearings “apparently consist[ed] of 
reports of investigations and cross examination of the suspected individuals,” and “[t]he proceedings 
[were] secret”). For more details on the detentions, see Scheiber, Scheiber & Jones, supra note 199, at 
24–38, 67–68. For an extensive discussion of conditions in Hawaii during the war, see HARRY N. 
SCHEIBER & JANE L. SCHEIBER, BAYONETS IN PARADISE: MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAIʻI DURING WORLD 
WAR II (2016). 
 211. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 309. 
 212. See, e.g., Robert S. Rankin, Hawaii Under Martial Law, 5 J. POL. 270, 27475 (1943) 
(quoting General Orders No. 29 (Dec. 16, 1941), that banned circuit courts from issuing writs of habeas 
corpus). 
2019] COURTS AND THE EXECUTIVE IN WARTIME 829 
petitioners sought habeas relief during this period. The first comprised those 
arrested for so-called “subversive” activities who were then detained by military 
authorities without criminal charges. The second encompassed persons who 
were tried and sentenced by military courts during the war. In both contexts, 
petitioners argued that the military’s exercise of emergency powers transgressed 
the Constitution, the Hawaiian Organic Act, or both.213 These cases are 
noteworthy given that, despite considerable disagreement over the merits of 
whether the government’s wartime policies were legal and justified, not one of 
the several federal courts to review these cases—including the Supreme Court—
ever questioned its jurisdiction to second-guess the actions of the political 
branches where appropriate.214 
The one case that made its way to the Supreme Court from Hawaii, Duncan 
v. Kahanamoku, is significant in this regard. Discussed extensively below, 
Duncan held unlawful the government’s declaration of martial law in the 
Hawaiian Islands and ultimately vacated the convictions of two civilians who 
had been tried by a military commission for embezzlement and assault. But 
Duncan was decided after the war—a fact that likely influenced the Court’s 
willingness to second-guess the government’s wartime decisions. In all events, 
there are several other matters to discuss before returning to Duncan, and for that 
we turn to the mainland. 
B. Executive Order 9066 
In the weeks following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, internal debates 
among key government officials quickly laid the groundwork for Executive 
Order 9066, which President Roosevelt issued on February 19, 1942.215 The 
order, signed ten weeks after the Japanese attack, authorized the Secretary of 
War to designate military zones “from which any or all persons may be 
excluded” and regulate the terms by which persons could enter, remain in, or be 
forced to leave such areas.216 By its own terms, 9066 included no language 
specifically targeting a particular race or ethnicity, or specifically mentioning 
detention.217 But it set in motion the massive detention of approximately 120,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry—including over 70,000 American citizens—in the 
western United States. Their internment stands as the most egregious violation 
of the Suspension Clause in American history. The story, as one historian put it, 
is nothing short of a “tragedy of democracy . . . . By arbitrarily confining 
American citizens of Japanese ancestry, the government violated the essential 
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principle of democracy: that all citizens are entitled to the same rights and legal 
protections.”218 
Notably, leading up to and following the issuance of 9066, many key 
participants in internal government debates expressed great skepticism over 
whether any evidence existed to support suspicions of widespread disloyalty on 
the part of persons of Japanese ancestry living in the United States. These doubts 
carried over to the wisdom of evacuation and internment policies directed at 
Japanese Americans. Indeed, just days before the issuance of 9066, a key War 
Department official acknowledged that “no one has justified fully the sheer 
military necessity for such action.”219 Similarly, at a meeting that took place in 
the early days of February 1942 between high-ranking War Department and 
Justice Department officials—including Attorney General Francis Biddle—the 
Justice Department officials remarked that “there is no evidence whatsoever of 
any reason for disturbing citizens.”220 Going further, they proposed a joint 
departmental statement that “the present military situation does not at this time 
require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race.”221 (Reports from 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover, concluding that a lack 
of evidence of disloyal activity failed to justify relocation proposals, surely 
influenced Biddle’s position.222) Subsequently, on February 7, 1942, Biddle 
informed the President that his department “believed mass evacuation at this time 
inadvisable,” and that “there were no reasons for mass evacuation.”223 Biddle 
further “emphasized the danger of the hysteria” that was so prevalent in the West 
“moving [E]ast.”224 The hysteria to which Biddle referred manifested itself in 
many ways, including western politicians pushing for mass evacuation and 
detention of Japanese Americans and anti-Japanese animus on the ground in 
western states grounded in racial and economic factors.225 
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Initially, General DeWitt, who held the post of Commanding General of 
the Western Defense Command—and who would soon promote and oversee the 
evacuation and internment policies on the West Coast—had his own doubts 
about the merits of internment. He rejected the idea as a departure from “common 
sense” and likely to “alienate the loyal Japanese.”226 He also recognized that 
American citizens were legally distinct from Japanese nationals, who were 
enemy aliens under traditional wartime policies. In fact, during early debates 
with the army’s provost marshal general over the merits of an internment policy, 
DeWitt emphasized: “An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen.”227 
Of course, these statements stand in stark contrast to reports that DeWitt soon 
pushed for evacuation policies targeting Japanese Americans228 and to his final 
recommendations to the President, delivered on February 13, 1942, that declared: 
“The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation 
Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have 
become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains are undiluted.”229 
As the push to intern persons of Japanese ancestry—aliens and citizens 
alike—gained momentum, Biddle repeatedly argued that no internment of 
citizens could occur without a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus.230 Responding to a letter from Representative Leland M. Ford of 
California advocating that “all Japanese, citizens or not, be placed in inland 
concentration camps,”231 Biddle wrote “unless the writ of habeas corpus is 
suspended, I do not know any way in which Japanese born in this country, and 
therefore American citizens, could be interned.”232 This statement is remarkable 
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insofar as it went against the tide inside the Roosevelt administration favoring 
internment and the fact that it originated from the chief law enforcement officer 
of the United States. 
A week later, at a meeting between Justice and War Department officials, 
Biddle again took the position that his department “[would] have nothing 
whatsoever to do with any interference with citizens, whether they are Japanese 
or not.”233 Biddle also reportedly stated in the meeting that “the Department of 
Justice would be through if [the War Department] interfered with citizens and 
[the] write [sic] of habeas corpus.”234 Biddle further declared that his Department 
would not “recommend the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.”235 During 
this same week, he also directly informed the President of his view that 
“American born Japanese, being citizens, cannot be apprehended or treated like 
alien enemies.”236 But Biddle also told the President in this same memorandum 
that “probably an arrangement can be made, where necessary, to evacuate them 
from military zones.”237 Likewise, he reported that a “[s]tudy [was] being made 
as to whether, with respect to them, the writ of habeas corpus could be suspended 
in case of an emergency.”238 
Early on in the war, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson also saw 
constitutional problems with the internment of citizens. On February 3, 1942, he 
wrote in his diary: “We cannot discriminate among our citizens on the ground of 
racial origin.”239 By ordering second-generation Japanese American citizens 
evacuated from the western states, Stimson believed, military policies “will 
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make a tremendous hole in our constitutional system.”240 There are additional 
indications, moreover, that Stimson understood the significance of the 
Suspension Clause as a constraint on the government’s ability to detain citizens 
without criminal charges. For example, in April 1942, when civil liberties groups 
were planning to file habeas petitions on behalf of Japanese American citizens 
who had been moved from Hawaii to the mainland for detention, Stimson 
ordered that the detainees to be returned Hawaii.241 Of course, there, the 
government had proclaimed a suspension and martial law. Thus, in Hawaii, as 
Stimson phrased it, “[W]e can do what we please with them.”242 Some years 
later, writing about the same events in his memoirs, Biddle chronicled that in the 
lead up to 9066, “the President had declared his unwillingness to suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus [on the mainland]” and had ordered the “citizen internees 
who had been brought over . . . returned to Hawaii.”243 Likely, the President was 
following Stimson’s counsel. 
Concerns about the constitutionality of internment, and specifically the 
Suspension Clause, came to the President’s attention on more than one occasion. 
In addition to Biddle’s words of caution, Assistant to the Attorney General James 
H. Rowe, Jr. wrote the following to Roosevelt’s private secretary Grace Tully on 
February 2, 1942: 
Please tell the President to keep his eye on the Japanese situation in 
California . . . . There is tremendous public pressure to move all of them 
out of California—citizens and aliens—and no one seems to worry 
about how or to where. There are about 125,000 of them, and if it 
happens, it will be one of the great mass exoduses of history. It would 
probably require suspension of the writ of habeas corpus—and my 
estimate of the country’s present feeling is that we would have another 
Supreme Court fight on our hands.244 
But the advice of Biddle and Rowe went unheeded by Roosevelt, who moved 
ahead in laying the groundwork for internment, all the while in the absence of a 
suspension.245 
Notably, the topic of suspension extended beyond discussions among 
Justice Department lawyers. Conversations about how to reconcile DeWitt’s 
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push for broad exclusion orders with constitutional concerns also arose inside 
the War Department. Thus, on February 3, while discussing the situation with 
DeWitt, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy promoted the idea that blanket 
exclusion orders for military areas could provide “cover . . . with the legal 
situation.”246 More specifically, McCloy argued that the Constitution posed no 
problem with respect to excluding both citizens and aliens of all stripes from 
military areas.247 Such orders, he argued, could be issued “without suspending 
writs of Habeas Corpus and without getting into very important legal 
complications.”248 Of course, in the same conversation, he also outlined a plan 
to “license back into the area” those thought not to pose a danger—in his words, 
“[e]veryone but the Japs.”249 
Almost immediately, however, McCloy dismissed his previous concerns 
regarding the “legal complications” to which he had referred in his conversation 
with DeWitt. In a contentious meeting with Biddle, McCloy reportedly 
responded to constitutional objections to the military’s proposals as follows: “[I]f 
it a question of safety of the country, the Constitution of the United States, why 
the Constitution is just a scrap of paper to me.”250 
As late as two days before the issuance of 9066, Biddle was still pushing 
back against proposals for mass evacuation, writing to the President that the “last 
advice from the War Department is that there is no evidence of imminent attack 
and from the F.B.I. that there is no evidence of planned sabotage.”251 Referring 
to newspaper columnists who were by this point pushing aggressively for the 
evacuation and internment of persons of Japanese descent, Biddle told the 
President that either they “ha[ve] information which the War Department and the 
F.B.I. apparently do not have, or [they are] acting with dangerous 
irresponsibility.”252 
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In the end, the very serious legal concerns that executive branch officials 
had raised about exclusion and internment—including concerns grounded in 
questions about citizenship, race, and the Suspension Clause—all went ignored. 
The same may be said of the well-documented doubts of any factual basis to 
support exclusion or internment. In January, for example, an important report 
prepared for the Chief of Naval Operations by Lieutenant Commander Kenneth 
D. Ringle argued that the so-called “‘Japanese Problem’ [had] been magnified 
out of its true proportion,” and reported that “the most dangerous” were already 
in custody or “known” to Naval Intelligence and/or the FBI.253 Reports from the 
FBI in early February found even less reason to suspect Japanese espionage on 
western shores.254 And FBI Director Hoover—himself no stranger to robust 
surveillance—believed that the push for internment was “based primarily upon 
public and political pressure rather than on factual data.”255 
In issuing 9066 and the military regulations that followed under its 
auspices, the President and military officials simply ignored these concerns. The 
results are best explained as following from the mindset held by McCloy and 
surely others that the Constitution was merely a “scrap of paper,” readily 
dismissed in the face of perceived threats to the nation.256 More generally, the 
developments leading up to and following the issuance of 9066 demonstrated the 
administration’s disposition to defer to the military on all fronts.257 
By the evening of February 17, 1942—just over two months after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor—Biddle had capitulated and given his “informal 
approval . . . after a personal conference with the Secretary of War” for what 
became 9066, placing the entire matter within the jurisdiction of the War 
Department.258 Describing Biddle’s change of course, Rowe later observed: 
“Frankly, he just folded under, I think.”259 After that, things moved quickly. 
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Roosevelt issued 9066 two days later, declaring that “the successful 
prosecution of the war require[d] every possible protection against espionage and 
against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and 
national-defense utilities.”260 In addition to authorizing the War Department to 
designate and regulate military zones, Roosevelt further directed the Secretary 
of War and his military commanders “to take such other steps as he or the 
appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance 
with the restrictions applicable to each Military area . . . .”261 Finally, Roosevelt 
authorized the Secretary of War “to provide for residents of any such area who 
are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other 
accommodations as may be necessary.”262 On March 21, 1942, Congress 
bolstered 9066 with Public Law 503, which declared it a criminal offense to 
violate any War Department restrictions or orders respecting any designated 
“military area or military zone.”263 Congress enacted the law at the prodding of 
the War Department.264 
In the months following the issuance of 9066, DeWitt issued a series of 
military orders designating military zones throughout the western United States 
and subjecting all alien enemies and “all persons of Japanese ancestry” in such 
zones to exclusion orders, curfew orders, and prohibitions on travel, among other 
things.265 By the end of March 1942, DeWitt had also prohibited such persons 
from leaving military areas, a prelude to the orders that followed in May and 
June, including Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1 and Public Proclamation No. 8. 
Those orders in turn required, “as a matter of military necessity,” that “all 
persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien” report to assembly 
centers.266 Evacuees were then subject to compulsory internment “for their 
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relocation, maintenance and supervision” in ten “War Relocation Centers” 
spread throughout the western states.267 At each step, DeWitt provided that 
violations of the military orders would result in criminal penalties under Public 
Law 503.268 Thus, under 9066, DeWitt claimed blanket authority to regulate in 
the name of “military necessity,” and he consistently and exclusively directed 
his military orders at “person[s] of Japanese ancestry, both alien and 
nonalien.”269 
Ultimately, as a result of 9066 and DeWitt’s military orders, the military 
forced the many thousands of persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast 
into so-called “Relocation Centers.” The government built the centers, which 
were really incarceration camps, in barren and desolate areas primarily in the 
western states, surrounding them with barbed wire fences and armed guards at 
all times.270 Those forced to live in the camps faced extreme conditions, little in 
the way of privacy, and substandard food and medical care.271 It was not 
uncommon for the military to split families apart and send family members to 
different camps.272 Those subject to detention were “permitted to take . . . only 
what they could carry.”273 As a result, “they were forced to abandon their homes, 
farms, furnishings, cars, and other belongings or to sell them off quickly at 
bargain prices.”274 In other words, “the vast majority of the West Coast Japanese 
Americans lost all their property.”275 
Once relocated to the internment camps, Japanese Americans were—with 
very few exceptions—confined for years and for much of the war. One could not 
leave the camps without permission. Over the course of the war, the government 
granted only a fraction of those detained the right to leave. The successful few 
encompassed predominantly those who enlisted in the military276 or secured 
employment in one of the few communities outside the restricted areas that were 
willing to accept Japanese Americans during the war. In the end, the average 
length of stay in the camps was nine hundred days. It was not until 1946 that the 
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government finally resettled the last of the Japanese Americans who had been 
incarcerated at the camps and closed the last detention camp established to house 
Japanese Americans, Tule Lake.277 
C. The Supreme Court During the War 
It did not take long for challenges to many facets of the military regulations 
in both Hawaii and on the mainland to reach the courts. Three important Supreme 
Court cases arose out of events on the mainland: Hirabayashi v. United States, 
Korematsu v. United States, and Ex parte Endo. Each was decided during the 
war. In the immediate wake of the war, the Court also decided Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku, which involved challenges to suspension and martial law in 
Hawaii.278 
Gordon Hirabayashi’s case was the first to reach the Court, in 1943. 
Hirabayashi was a senior at the University of Washington and a natural-born 
citizen whose parents had immigrated from Japan. Hirabayashi refused to 
register with military authorities as part of the process that would surely result in 
his relocation to a camp. To force a legal challenge to the regulations, he also 
violated the curfew order declared for the military area in which he lived. After 
being convicted in a civilian court for violating both military regulations, 
Hirabayashi argued on appeal that Congress had delegated too much authority to 
DeWitt and that the military orders unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis 
of race and ethnicity.279 
A unanimous Supreme Court rejected both arguments, opining with respect 
to the latter: 
The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened 
invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition 
of facts and circumstances which indicate that a group of one national 
extraction may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly 
beyond the limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned merely 
because in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are 
irrelevant.280 
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Chief Justice Stone wrote the opinion for the Court and expressly limited 
the Court’s holding to the curfew order.281 Even in its limited form, however, the 
Court’s holding included deeply troubling language that was dismissive of 
Hirabayashi’s discrimination claims and sanctioned the government’s actions. 
Specifically, the Court posited: “We cannot close our eyes to the fact, 
demonstrated by experience, that in time of war, residents having ethnic 
affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those 
of a different ancestry.”282 The Court was able to avoid questions surrounding 
the military orders pertaining to registration, evacuation, and internment only 
because Hirabayashi’s sentences for his two convictions had been ordered to run 
concurrently.283 In other words, the Court concluded that affirming the curfew 
violation conviction sufficed to sustain Hirabayashi’s sentence. 
The Supreme Court similarly deferred to the military’s judgment the 
following year in Fred Korematsu’s case. Korematsu, born and raised in 
Oakland, California, was also the son of Japanese immigrants and also a United 
States citizen. Once he defied military exclusion orders, the government 
successfully prosecuted him for remaining in a designated military zone. On 
appeal, Korematsu argued that the relevant military orders were the product of 
unconstitutional delegations of executive and judicial powers, that they had 
improperly targeted him for non-criminal purposes, and that the entire apparatus 
of the regulations issued under 9066 was the product of unconstitutional and 
invidious discrimination. 
But it did not matter. Just as it had one year earlier in Hirabayashi, the 
Court deferred to the military and declined yet again to “reject as unfounded the 
judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal 
members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely 
and quickly ascertained.”284 Continuing, the Court observed: “We cannot say 
that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for 
believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and 
separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and 
safety.”285 Although opining that “[c]ompulsory exclusion of large groups of 
citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and 
peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions,” the Court 
nonetheless held that “when . . . our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the 
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power to protect [must prevail].”286 Put most simply, deference to military 
judgment ruled the day. 
More generally, the Court also refused to discuss the assembly centers and 
internment camps that had followed under the purview of 9066. Korematsu had 
argued—correctly, of course—that he would have been required to report to an 
assembly center once he had complied with the evacuation order that he violated. 
But the Court was determined only to discuss the legality of the evacuation order 
and to avoid the proverbial elephant in the room. Explaining the narrowness of 
its analysis, the Court observed that its task “would be simple, our duty clear, 
were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration 
camp because of racial prejudice . . . . [But] we are dealing specifically with 
nothing but an exclusion order.”287 Concurring, Justice Frankfurter likewise 
declined to reach the larger issues raised in the case, while nonetheless going on 
record to say that the Court’s holding should not be read as “approval of that 
which Congress and the Executive did. That is their business, not ours.”288 
Unlike in Hirabayashi, this time the majority’s position met with dissent. 
One such dissenter, Justice Owen Roberts, summarized the case as “convicting 
a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration 
camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence 
or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United 
States.” Roberts further chastised the Court for “shut[ting its] eyes to reality.”289 
Another dissenter, Justice Frank Murphy, described the military framework 
operating in the West as “fall[ing] into the ugly abyss of racism.”290 The final 
dissenter, Justice Robert Jackson, argued that the Court should not have taken up 
the case because its decision had created a dangerous precedent for future 
generations. Speaking nonetheless to the merits, Jackson reduced the principle 
at issue in the case to the following: “[I]f any fundamental assumption underlies 
our system, it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable.”291 
Korematsu reveals that by 1944 the Court was no longer unified in 
deferring to the government on wartime matters and that some Justices were 
prepared to address the internment directly. Nonetheless, a majority led by 
Justice Black (who would sound very different in Duncan two years later) upheld 
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Korematsu’s conviction in language that deferred extensively to the military, 
accepting its national security-based justifications without any second-guessing. 
In so doing, the Court established a precedent that, to borrow from Justice 
Jackson’s dissent, “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”292 
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ex parte Endo on the very 
same day as Korematsu in December of 1944. Endo finally posed a direct 
constitutional challenge to the detention of Japanese American citizens. 
Nonetheless, the Court again declined to speak to the constitutionality of the 
internment program, and did so despite being presented with formidable 
arguments grounded expressly in the Suspension Clause.293 
The case arose out of the State of California’s suspension of all employees 
of Japanese ancestry, one of whom was Mitsuye Endo. Endo, a United States 
citizen who had been born in California, did not speak Japanese, came from a 
family that did not subscribe to a Japanese language paper, and had not gone to 
a Japanese language school. She was also a Methodist and had a brother serving 
in the Pacific with the United States Army.294 Endo was, in the words of her 
attorney James Purcell, “the ideal candidate” for preparing a habeas corpus 
petition on behalf of all Japanese Americans subject to the internment policy.295 
Purcell, a Stanford-educated attorney practicing in San Francisco, had been 
brought in by the Japanese American Citizens League to challenge the 
suspensions of California State employees of Japanese ancestry.296 But after 
seeing the deplorable conditions at Tanforan Assembly Center near San 
Francisco, he chose instead to challenge the internment policy. Having grown up 
at Folsom Prison, where his father was a guard, Purcell said of Tanforan: “I was 
unable to distinguish [it] from the prison except that the walls were barbed wire 
fences; more frequent gun towers; more difficulty of entering to see a client; and 
the convicts were better housed than my American citizen clients who were not 
accused of any crime.”297 He later reflected on that moment: “When I came out 
of this institution, I had determined to see what I could do about it.”298 
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Purcell selected Endo as the ideal petitioner after viewing the results of a 
questionnaire that he had distributed to the suspended California employees.299 
He then funded the case entirely out of his own pocket and stayed the course 
even in the face of threats to his person and his family.300 Meanwhile, like so 
many others, Endo not only lost her job because of her Japanese ancestry, but 
she had also been forced to evacuate the military area encompassing her home 
in Sacramento, report to an assembly center, and submit to internment with her 
family at Tule Lake Camp.301 Purcell filed Endo’s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in July 1942.302 After a lengthy stay in federal district court that ended in 
defeat, Purcell appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. During this period, the government transferred Endo to another camp in 
Topaz, Utah. The Ninth Circuit in turn declined to resolve her appeal, instead 
certifying the case to the Supreme Court for resolution.303 
Endo was a determined—indeed, heroic litigant—for she endured almost 
two additional years in the camps to keep her habeas petition alive after turning 
down the government’s offer of release, which was conditioned upon not 
returning to restricted areas on the West Coast.304 Had she accepted the offer, her 
case would have become moot like so many other wartime habeas cases before 
hers. But, as she later explained: “The fact that I wanted to prove that we of 
Japanese ancestry were not guilty of any crime and that we were loyal American 
citizens kept me from abandoning the suit.”305 
Endo’s brief to the Court reflected the work of an attorney well-versed in 
the key authorities relating to suspension and martial law. Purcell relied upon 
important earlier Supreme Court habeas decisions in Ex parte Bollman, Ex parte 
Merryman, and Ex parte Milligan, as well as Justice Story’s Commentaries on 
the Constitution, among other authorities, to argue that the President had no 
power to hold a citizen outside the criminal process in the absence of a 
suspension. Quoting extensively from Milligan, a case Purcell labeled as 
“familiar to everyone who has even a smattering of constitutional law,” Endo’s 
brief asked: 
Since the military authorities have no jurisdiction by virtue of a 
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Presidential proclamation to try a civilian for an alleged offense in a 
district where the civil Courts are open, how much less right have they 
to imprison a citizen without any trial at all, when he is neither charged 
with, nor suspected of, any crime, and when his loyalty (as in this case), 
is not called into question? 306 
Elaborating, Endo’s brief argued that only a valid congressional suspension of 
the privilege could render lawful the detention of citizens outside the criminal 
process.307 Finally, Endo’s brief contended that no state of martial law existed to 
justify the internment and more generally that “the existence of a state of war 
does not suspend constitutional rights.” 308 Curiously, the government’s reply 
brief did not even engage with Endo’s Suspension Clause arguments and instead 
primarily recited a descriptive narrative of the military orders issued under the 
auspices of 9066. 
As the litigation unfolded, the government recognized that Endo “[was] a 
loyal and law-abiding citizen.”309 Further, the government “concede[d] that it is 
beyond the power of the War Relocation Authority to detain citizens against 
whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness have been made for a period 
longer than necessary to separate the loyal from the disloyal and to provide the 
necessary guidance for relocation.”310 These concessions provided a roadmap for 
the narrow Court opinion that followed under the pen of Justice William O. 
Douglas. The Court, he wrote, would “not come to the underlying constitutional 
issues which have been argued.”311 Instead of delving into the constitutional 
thicket, the Court held that the governing regulations required the release of Endo 
and other concededly loyal citizens from relocation centers because “[a] citizen 
who is concededly loyal presents no problem of espionage or sabotage.”312 
Continuing, Douglas wrote that “[l]oyalty is a matter of the heart and mind, not 
of race, creed, or color . . . . When the power to detain is derived from the power 
to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention which has no 
relationship to that objective is unauthorized.”313 In the end, Douglas 
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“mention[ed]” a list of constitutional provisions—including the Suspension 
Clause—”not to stir the constitutional issues which have been argued at the bar,” 
but instead to explain why the Court would “give[] a narrower scope” or reading 
to the governing legislation and executive orders at issue.314 
In an interview some years later, Douglas claimed: “I had the desire to put 
it on the constitutional grounds but I couldn’t get a Court to do that.”315 His notes 
from the Justices’ conference on the case, however, do not reference any 
constitutional claims and instead lay out the narrow approach that his opinion 
ultimately followed.316 This being said, his law clerk—the first woman law clerk 
on the Supreme Court—had recommended to him two paths: the one of 
constitutional avoidance that he ultimately took and an alternative that would 
have held, for the first time, that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
incorporates an equal protection component that would have subjected the 
military regulations to anti-discrimination principles.317 Nevertheless, despite 
the public urging of at least two justices (and likely a third)—one of whom 
argued that “[a]n admittedly loyal citizen . . . should be free to come and go as 
she pleases”318—the Court once again avoided addressing the serious 
constitutional issues implicated by the internment policies and instead delivered 
an exceedingly minimalist decision. 
                                                            
Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment’s Shadow, 68 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 260, 267–74 (2005). 
 314. Endo, 323 U.S. at 299 (applying a clear statement rule). 
 315. Transcriptions of Conversations Between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter 
F. Murphy, Cassette No. 8 (May 23, 1962), https://findingaids.princeton.edu/collections/MC015/c09 
[https://perma.cc/8WZV-8XF7]. These transcriptions were quoted in Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember 
Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1953 (2003) (“Black, Frankfurter, Stone, were very clear that that was 
not unconstitutional but that . . . Endo would have to turn upon the construction of the regulations.”). 
 316. Douglas’s notes read: “U.S. concedes . . . clearance implied determination that she was not 
disloyal . . . . once loyalty is shown basis for military decision disappears—this woman is entitled to 
summary release.” Justice William O. Douglas Conference Notes (Oct. 16, 1944), Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 
Lucile Lomen Collection (SC0776), Box 1, Folder 11, Dept. of Special Collections and University 
Archives (Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, CA). 
 317. It does not appear that Douglas’s law clerk briefed Suspension Clause issues to the Justice. 
See Jennie Berry Chandra, Lucile Lomen: The First Female United States Supreme Court Law Clerk, in 
IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 206, 207 (Todd C. 
Peppers & Artemus Ward eds., 2012). It would take another ten years before the Court finally adopted 
the latter argument in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) and subjected the federal government to 
the non-discrimination principles of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 318. Justice Roberts questioned the Court’s interpretation of the military regulations and made 
the above constitutional argument. Endo, 323 U.S. at 310 (Roberts, J.). Justice Murphy would have held 
the internment to be a product of “the unconstitutional resort to racism.” Id. at 307 (Murphy, J., 
concurring). Justice Jackson’s files reveal that he made notes on a draft of Douglas’s Endo opinion 
suggesting he, too, would have reached the constitutional issues and found for Endo: “Finds no 
constitutional vice/Seems to sanction mass detention without individual charges of disloyalty.” Robert 
H. Jackson, Handwritten Note (circulated Nov. 8, 1944), Manuscript Division, Papers of Robert H. 
Jackson, , Container No. 133 (Library of Congress) (marginal note on first page of Douglas opinion in 
Endo) (cited in Gudridge, supra note 315, at 1959). Justice Jackson also penned a concurrence that he 
never circulated suggesting as much. See Gudridge, supra note 315, at 1959, 1969–70. His draft is 
discussed further below. 
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It appears that the Court delayed announcing its Endo decision to give the 
government more time to prepare its response, and possibly to stall until after the 
1944 presidential election. Supporting this conclusion is an internal Court 
memorandum sent by Douglas to the Chief Justice in November 1944 asking 
why, if the entire Court agreed that the government was detaining Endo 
unlawfully, the decision had yet to be announced.319 Some weeks later, on 
December 18, 1944, the Court finally released the decision, but only one day 
after the President essentially rescinded 9066. On December 17, 1944, Major 
General Henry C. Pratt issued Public Proclamation No. 21, which declared that 
as of January 2, 1945, all Japanese American evacuees were free to return to their 
homes on the West Coast.320 In the weeks that followed, the government began 
the process of closing down the camps. At the time—some three years after the 
attacks on Pearl Harbor—the camps still detained some 85,000 persons.321 
D. The Supreme Court After the War 
By 1946, when it tackled the Duncan case, the Supreme Court was no 
longer inclined to give blanket deference to the military. Duncan actually 
involved two underlying cases brought by petitioners Harry E. White and Lloyd 
C. Duncan. Both were United States citizens who had been denied a host of 
procedural rights during their trials by provost courts for criminal charges 
relating to, in White’s case, embezzlement, and in Duncan’s, the assault of two 
Marine sentries.322 They had filed their petitions in 1944, a full year after the 
initial restoration of civil government and reopening of civilian courts on the 
Islands. 
In each petitioner’s case, the district court explored in detail whether 
existing conditions justified the suspension in Hawaii and ultimately ordered 
both petitioners released. After the Ninth Circuit reversed, the Supreme Court 
granted review of petitioners’ challenges to the lawfulness of both the suspension 
and the wartime military rule then governing in the Hawaiian Territory.323 But 
before the consolidated cases made their way to the Court, Roosevelt formally 
                                                            
 319. See Memorandum from William O. Douglas to Harlan Stone (Nov. 28, 1944), Manuscript 
Division, Papers of William O. Douglas, Box 116, Folder No. 70 O.T. 1944, Endo v. Eisenhower, 
Certiorari, Conference & Misc. Memos, (Library of Congress) (arguing that a government request for 
delay should be ignored and that “Endo . . . is a citizen, insisting on her right to be released—a right 
which we all agree she has. I feel strongly that we should act promptly and not lend our aid in 
compounding the wrong through our inaction any longer than necessary to reach a decision”) (quoted 
in Gudridge, supra note 315, at 1935 n.11); see also IRONS, supra note 201, at 344–45; ROBINSON, 
supra note 218, at 230 (noting the widely reported rumor that Justice Frankfurter had tipped off the War 
Department as to the forthcoming holding); Gudridge, supra note 315, at 1953–64 (detailing the 
Justices’ deliberations in Endo). 
 320. Public Proclamation No. 21 (Dec. 17, 1944), 10 Fed. Reg. 53–54 (Jan. 2, 1945). 
 321. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, PT. 2, supra note 13, at 3. 
 322. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307–311 (1946). 
 323. Id. One of the two questions on which the Court granted certiorari read: “Was the privilege 
of the writ of habeas corpus suspended as to this case on April 20, 1944?” Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 7, Duncan, 327 U.S. 304 (No. 791). 
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terminated martial law in Hawaii and restored the writ of habeas corpus in an 
order issued on October 24, 1944.324 In light of his acts, the Supreme Court chose 
“not [to] pass upon the validity of the order suspending the privilege of habeas 
corpus,” although it had granted review over the question.325 
The Court nonetheless proceeded to reach the merits of the petitioners’ 
challenge to martial law and the propriety of their military trials. The Court 
began by rejecting outright the notion that such questions should be immune 
from judicial review. As Chief Justice Stone observed in a concurring opinion, 
“executive action is not proof of its own necessity, and the military’s judgment 
here is not conclusive that every action taken pursuant to the declaration of 
martial law was justified by the exigency.”326 It followed that asserted military 
necessity, standing alone, could not sustain the government’s actions. Notably, 
this was the same Chief Justice Stone who only three years earlier had written 
for the Court and deferred extensively to the military in Hirabayashi. 
Now, charting a very different course, the Court held that any declaration 
of martial law must be subject to significant judicial scrutiny because such a 
declaration represents the “antithesis” of our system of “[c]ourts 
and . . . procedural safeguards.”327 Applying such scrutiny to the case at bar, the 
Court found the facts supporting the necessity of martial law wanting: 
[M]ilitary trials of civilians charged with crime, especially when not 
made subject to judicial review, are so obviously contrary to our 
political traditions and our institution of jury trials in courts of law, that 
the tenuous circumstance offered by the Government can hardly suffice 
to . . . permit[] such a radical departure from our steadfast beliefs.328 
Justice Black’s majority opinion listed several historic precedents to support this 
proposition. These included President Washington’s instructions to the military 
during the Whiskey Rebellion, which Black emphasized as highlighting the 
military’s subordination to civilian authorities and its obligation to deliver 
insurgents to the civilian courts.329 Black was, at the same time, careful to except 
                                                            
 324. See Proclamation No. 2627, 3 C.F.R. 41 (1943–1948) (Oct. 24, 1944). Details on the 
transition to civil law may be found in Anthony, supra note 202, at 482–483. At the time, some news 
accounts pointed to Judge Delbert E. Metzger’s role in the demise of martial law in the Islands. See, e.g., 
Two Years Too Late, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 28, 1944, at 10 (“[Roosevelt] would not have yielded to 
the obvious even now if it had not been for the resolute courage of Judge Delbert E. Metzger . . . .”); see 
also id. (“Mr. Roosevelt has ended martial law in Hawaii, two years too late and less than two weeks 
before the election.”). 
 325. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 312 n.5. 
 326. Id. at 336 (Stone, C.J., concurring). 
 327. Id. at 322 (majority opinion). The procedures of the provost courts were different, to say the 
least, from that of the typical civilian court. For example, one press account noted that before the Ninth 
Circuit, Duncan’s lawyers “described a typical provost court judge as a soldier sitting on the bench with 
a gun on one side, a gas mask on the other, and ‘a big cigar in his mouth.’” Charge Abuse of Civilians 
in Army Courts: Tell of Judges in Hawaii with Guns at Side, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, July 2, 1944, 
at 1. 
 328. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 317. 
 329. Id. at 320–21. 
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from the Court’s discussion the “well-established power of the military to 
exercise jurisdiction over members of the armed forces,” as well as “enemy 
belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with violating the laws of 
war.”330 This was an important caveat when held up against the Court’s decision 
earlier in the war on this subject in Ex parte Quirin.331 
The Duncan Court then relied upon the post-Civil War decision Ex parte 
Milligan’s “emphatic[] declar[ation] that ‘civil liberty and this kind of martial 
law . . . [are] irreconcilable’” to declare that the Hawaiian Organic Act had not 
authorized the displacement of civil law any more than absolutely necessary.332 
(Recall that the territorial governor purported to draw his authority to suspend 
and declare martial law on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor bombings from the 
Hawaiian Organic Act.333) In the Court’s view, it did not matter that the 
Hawaiian Organic Act had expressly recognized the declaration of martial law 
as a wartime possibility. Nor did the Court pause in the face of government 
assertions of wartime necessity. Indeed, Chief Justice Stone took the position in 
his concurrence that the record clearly showed that, even as early as February 
1942, “the civil courts were capable of functioning, and that trials of petitioners 
in the civil courts no more endangered the public safety than the gathering of the 
populace in saloons and places of amusement, which was authorized by military 
order.”334 Notably, the Court did not decide the case on constitutional grounds, 
as it had Milligan, but the Constitution loomed large in the backdrop all the 
same.335 
Thus, some eight months after the Japanese surrendered to Allied forces, 
the Duncan Court rejected the sweeping imposition of martial law in the 
Hawaiian Territory, which had governed during most of the war and embraced 
once again—as it had in the wake of the Civil War in Milligan—a narrow view 
of martial law grounded in necessity. Implicit in the Duncan decision was a 
recognition that any other ruling would have sanctioned the large-scale and 
years-long displacement of core constitutional protections associated with 
individual liberty. Further, the strongest argument in favor of permitting 
Congress such license—its broad powers over United States territories—gave 
the Court little pause. Specifically, the Justices rejected outright the idea that 
                                                            
 330. Id. at 313–14. Black also excepted the situation in which the military establishes tribunals 
“as a part of a temporary military government over occupied enemy territory or territory regained from 
an enemy where civilian government cannot and does not function.” Id. at 314. 
 331. See 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 332. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 324 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124, 125 (1866)). 
 333. See supra text accompanying notes 202–206. 
 334. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 337 (Stone, C.J., concurring). 
 335. Concurring, Justice Murphy believed the Constitution compelled reversal. See id. at 325 
(Murphy, J., concurring). Chief Justice Stone, also concurring, observed that the Court had a long history 
of case law defining martial law as “a law of necessity,” and argued that the precedents must inform the 
Court’s interpretation of the Hawaiian Organic Act. Id. at 620 (Stone, C.J., concurring). 
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Hawaiian citizens enjoyed lesser claim to the constitutional rights associated 
with a fair trial.336 
E. Anticanons, the Forgotten Suspension Clause, and Declining 
Deference: Evaluating the Court’s Work 
As explored above, both during and immediately following the war, the 
Supreme Court confronted a host of issues involving how the Constitution 
functions in wartime. Thus, the Court reviewed a host of military regulations 
issued under 9066, including those that led to the mass detention of Japanese 
Americans and the imposition of martial law and suspension of habeas corpus in 
the Hawaiian Territory. In evaluating the Court’s work, one finds a Court eager 
to stay out of the political thicket during the war, just as the British courts had 
done. But one also finds a Court that grew more comfortable rebuking excessive 
exercises of executive power after the war. 
Begin with the cases arising under 9066. The military directed its 
regulations implemented under the auspices of 9066 solely at persons of 
Japanese ancestry, whether United States citizens or not. Thus, the policies quite 
obviously involved deeply troubling questions of racial and ethnic 
discrimination. To the Court, this was of no moment. Specifically, the Court in 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu infamously rejected the argument that such 
targeting violated the constitutional principles of either due process or equal 
protection, the latter a doctrine not yet fully incorporated as applying to the 
federal government. (That did not come until 1954 in Bolling v. Sharpe.337) As 
any law student today knows, Korematsu has come to epitomize what 
constitutional law scholars call an “anticanon”—namely, a decision that is 
widely accepted as wrong.338 And it is. For this reason, last Term, the Supreme 
Court overruled Korematsu, albeit in dictum.339 It bears highlighting, however, 
that the Court has never overruled Hirabayashi, which contains similarly broad, 
dangerous, and deeply troubling language.340 
Beyond the glaring discriminatory nature of all of the regulations issued 
under 9066, there was an additional constitutional problem with the end result of 
those regulations, namely the mass detention of Japanese Americans. 
Specifically, their incarceration plainly and egregiously violated the Suspension 
                                                            
 336. See id., 327 U.S. at 318 (majority opinion) (“[C]ivilians in Hawaii are entitled to the 
constitutional guarantee of fair trial to the same extent as those who live in any other part of our 
country.”). 
 337. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 338. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 422–27 (2011). 
 339. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
 340.  In this respect, one might analogize Hirabayashi to Beowulf’s second monster. See Eric L. 
Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335926). 
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Clause.341 Notably, many key government actors recognized this point when the 
military first proposed an internment policy. But in the end, it was only the 
dissents of Justices Roberts and Jackson in Korematsu, along with Justice 
Jackson’s uncirculated concurrence in Endo discussed below, that hinted at what 
Biddle had recognized from the very beginning—namely, that the internment of 
Japanese American citizens could not take place “unless the writ of habeas 
corpus [wa]s suspended.”342 
Whatever the reason for the Court’s approach in the Japanese American 
cases during the war—whether it derived from the targeted nature of the 
regulations, excessive deference to the military, or something else—the 
contemporary failure properly to recognize this glaring constitutional problem 
with the internment is profoundly regrettable. The historical evidence 
resoundingly shows that the Suspension Clause’s core purpose is to prohibit the 
detention of citizens outside the criminal process in the absence of a valid 
suspension.343 The suspension model has been consistent for centuries, whether 
faced with Jacobite sympathizers suspected of plotting to return the throne to the 
Stuart line, American colonists fighting for independence, or alleged 
Confederate sympathizers during the Civil War. Specifically, where those 
suspected of disloyalty have enjoyed the habeas privilege either under the 
Habeas Corpus Act or the Suspension Clause, Anglo-American habeas 
jurisprudence has always required a valid suspension to authorize detention for 
national security purposes outside the criminal process—even in wartime. Up 
until World War II, American law had long recognized that the proper means of 
legalizing detentions of this very nature was through suspension and only 
through suspension.344 
Further, contrary to the suggestion of the Endo Court, it has never mattered 
whether a person has passed a so-called “loyalty” test, nor should it. In the 
absence of a valid suspension, lawful detention—whether in wartime or not—
may only be predicated upon timely criminal proceedings. Endo, in this regard, 
                                                            
 341.  To be sure, some have argued for an understanding of the Suspension Clause that would 
not have served as a bar to the mass detention of Japanese Americans during World War II. For example, 
one professor who interprets the Clause solely as a remedial measure contends: 
“[T]he need to constitutionalize a guarantee to criminal process in citizen detention scenarios 
is—at least in terms of raw numbers—quite small . . . . [Further,] because it eliminates excess 
detention capacity, [such a rule] over-constrains military flexibility during periods of non-
suspension.” Lee Kovarsky, Citizenship, National Security Detention, and the Habeas 
Remedy, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 867, 903-904 (2019). Given that the government incarcerated 
some 120,000 Japanese Americans—70,000 of whom were citizens—for years on end and 
based upon no reason other than general discriminatory animus, it is more than a little 
difficult to conclude that this conception of the suspension authority presents a benign danger. 
See id. (maintaining erroneously that “the number of citizens the executive has subjected to 
indefinite national security detentions is negligible”). 
 342. Memorandum, Attorney General Francis Biddle to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
(Feb. 20, 1942), Japanese Evacuation and Relocation Study Papers, reel 1 (Bancroft Library, University 
of California, Berkeley). 
 343. See generally, TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34. 
 344. For extensive discussion of this background, see generally id. 
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missed the forest for the trees.345 And although Justice Jackson wrote a 
concurrence in Endo that criticized the Court’s emphasis on loyalty and came 
very close to embracing the proper interpretation of the Suspension Clause, he 
never cited the Clause itself. He also apparently never circulated his opinion and 
he opened the draft by disclaiming that “[i]f [Endo] were in military custody for 
security reasons, even if I thought them weak ones, I should doubt our right to 
interfere for reasons I have stated in Korematsu’s case.”346 This language 
undercuts the notion that Jackson understood the function of the Suspension 
Clause in the Constitution. Nonetheless, Jackson’s subsequent language bears 
highlighting for embracing the Clause’s core purpose: 
“[P]rotective custody” on an involuntary basis has no place in American 
law. The whole idea that our American citizens’ right to be at large may 
be conditioned or denied by community prejudice or disapproval should 
be rejected by this Court the first time it is heard within these walls.347 
Further, in Endo, there was no argument to be made that martial law 
somehow justified the mass internment of Japanese Americans in the western 
United States. As Milligan held, and as Duncan later reaffirmed, martial law is 
only appropriate within the “theatre of active military operations, where war 
really prevails . . . [and] no power is left but the military.”348 Borrowing further 
from Milligan, the civilian courts in the western United States were fully “open 
and their process unobstructed.”349 Accordingly, the Court’s holding in Endo—
despite ushering in the demise of the internment camps—misunderstood the 
entire history of the Suspension Clause and regrettably left unquestioned as a 
constitutional matter a deeply problematic and dangerous historical precedent. 
There were additional problems with the Court’s decision to defer to the 
executive in the Japanese American cases. As detailed above, the President 
himself had been briefed on these constitutional problems, but nevertheless 
issued 9066 and gave the military extensive discretion to implement 9066 as it 
saw fit. In so doing, Roosevelt apparently subscribed to the view that such legal 
questions were not the proper concern of a wartime president but instead the 
                                                            
 345. As the late Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote of this episode, “[e]ven in wartime, citizens may 
not be rounded up and required to prove their loyalty.” WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT 
ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 206 (1998). The Endo majority opinion emphasized loyalty in 
reaching its holding, noting: “He who is loyal is by definition not a spy or saboteur. When the power to 
detain is derived from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention 
which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized.” Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944). 
 346. Gudridge, supra note 315, at 1969 (quoting J. Jackson’s draft concurrence). 
 347. Id. at 1970; see id. at 1969 (“There is no way by which trial techniques can establish what 
is in a man’s heart . . . .”). Jackson also wrote: “[U]nder our form of government it has never been 
thought that a citizen must prove or be admitted to be harmless in order to be free. On the contrary, it 
has been supposed that it must be charged that he has committed or conspired or attempted or threatened 
to commit some crime before he could be temporarily detained, and the charge must be speedily proved 
if he is to be held.” Id. 
 348. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866). 
 349. Id. at 121. 
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proper province of the courts.350 Setting aside for the present whether there is 
merit in this argument—which overlooks the fact that the President, just like 
Article III judges, takes an oath to uphold the Constitution—this only highlights 
that the Court’s handling the World War II Japanese American cases was not its 
finest hour. As Professor Eugene Rostow aptly lamented soon after the decisions 
came down (primarily targeting Hirabayashi and Korematsu): “This was not the 
occasion for prudent withdrawal on the part of the Supreme Court, but for 
affirmative leadership in causes peculiarly within its sphere of primary 
responsibility.”351 With the benefit of hindsight, however, the fact that the Court 
never ruled on the Suspension Clause’s role in these cases may well be a good 
thing, given that it could have announced an erroneous and dangerous precedent 
upholding the internment against constitutional challenge. 
The contrast between Duncan, decided after the war, and Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu, decided during the war, is hard to overstate.352 Unlike in its wartime 
decisions, the Court in Duncan said nothing of deference to a wartime executive 
and the military and did not hesitate to second-guess policies implemented in the 
wake of Pearl Harbor. Instead, the opinion stands as a stark rebuke of 
government wartime policies in the Hawaiian Islands and a strong endorsement 
of Ex parte Milligan’s continuing validity. 
It is likely no accident that the Court decided both Milligan and Duncan in 
the postwar setting, when the stakes of rendering an opinion reproaching the 
executive branch are seemingly much lower. On this score, two dissenting 
Justices in Duncan argued that it was “all too easy in this postwar period to 
assume that the success which our forces attained was inevitable and that military 
control should have been relaxed on a schedule based upon such actual 
developments.”353 
Regardless of whether the dissenters had a valid point, there may be more 
to the story behind Duncan. Duncan’s author, Justice Black, had also authored 
the exceedingly deferential decision in Korematsu. Perhaps by 1946, Black had 
realized that the government had misled the Korematsu Court as to key 
                                                            
 350. See infra at text accompanying notes 388–390. 
 351. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 504, 
511 (1945). Another early scholarly evaluation was equally harsh. See GRODZINS, supra note 2, at 358 
(criticizing the Court for ignoring the “extreme gravity of the civil liberties deprivation; its racial 
character; the fact that people were condemned en masse rather than according to the principle of 
individual liability; and the belief held by many that evacuation was the result of public pressures and 
racial animosity rather than the result of carefully conceived military policy”). 
 352. The same may be said of the contrast between Duncan and the Court’s wartime decision in 
Ex parte Quirin. See 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Quirin—which upheld the military commission convictions of 
eight Nazi saboteurs, one of whom claimed United States citizenship—was decided on an expedited 
basis early in the war. It was more recently relied upon by the Court as support for the proposition that 
United States citizens may be held as enemy combatants in the ongoing war on terrorism. See Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). For discussion and criticism of Quirin and Hamdi, see TYLER, 
HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME, supra note 34, at 246–62. 
 353. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 351 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting, joined by 
Frankfurter, J.). 
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underlying facts. Indeed, in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court’s 
deference to the government followed expressly from arguments predicated 
upon military necessity. But as explored above, the well-documented positions 
of many key government officials, along with a number of intelligence reports 
from the period immediately preceding the issuance of 9066, undermine any 
argument of military necessity. (For that matter, a factual record on the question 
had never been developed in the lower courts in either case, as would normally 
be required.354) This important background led two prominent Justice 
Department lawyers charged with briefing both cases to concede in the briefing 
that there existed little evidence to support DeWitt’s claims about the threat 
posed by Japanese Americans in the West. In both cases, superiors removed the 
concessions.355 (In Korematsu, the government’s brief was already at the printer 
when superiors ordered the changes.)356 
In the end, the Court’s approach to reviewing the wartime actions of the 
political branches in Duncan and Milligan stand entirely at odds with its 
approach in Hirabayashi and Korematsu with respect to the question of 
deference to government claims of military necessity. The next Part tackles the 
propriety of judicial deference in wartime within the larger context of revisiting 
and evaluating the treatment of citizen detention matters by the political actors 
in Great Britain and United States during the war. 
IV. 
“[T]HE CONSTITUTION HAS NEVER GREATLY BOTHERED ANY WARTIME 
PRESIDENT” 
Given that Great Britain and the United States share a common legal 
tradition in which the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus looms large, there is 
much to be learned by comparing the approach of each country to the detention 
of citizens outside the criminal process during World War II. Ultimately, both 
countries did so. But unlike the British policies,  
the American policies targeted a specific racial and ethnic group. Further, the 
scale of the American program massively eclipsed that of the British program. It 
                                                            
 354. The dissents of both Murphy and Jackson drew attention to the potential importance of this 
development. Jackson, for example, asked “How does the Court know that these orders have a 
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court.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
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208 (2015). 
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was also the case that one of the major influences behind shutting down the 
British program was Churchill, while in the United States, Roosevelt resisted 
closing the internment camps at just about every turn. In the meantime, the courts 
in both countries deferred extensively—if not entirely—to the political branches 
during the war with respect to the wartime detention policies. In Britain, the Law 
Lords all but refused to review individual challenges, while in the United States, 
the Supreme Court rubber-stamped invidious discrimination in Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu and dodged the important constitutional questions presented in Endo. 
Even when it did hand a wartime victory to a litigant, as it did in Endo, it was 
narrow and only came after the Court gave the White House time to preempt its 
effect and announce the closing of the camps. 
Comparing the British and American experiences during the war prompts 
several significant questions. First, what might this comparison teach us about 
the ability of the executive branch (or, for that matter, the political branches more 
generally) to self-police with respect to constitutional principles and legal 
traditions in wartime? Second, what lessons might this comparison offer with 
respect to the proper role of the courts in reviewing the actions of the political 
branches during such periods? And finally, how might the distinctive aspects of 
the British and American legal and political traditions inform these separation of 
powers inquiries? 
In wartime Britain, policing the preventive detention of citizens turned on 
“self-regulation within the executive . . . with only a very limited degree of 
public accountability dependent upon the leakage of at least some information 
about what [was] going on,”357 along with parliamentary oversight.358 Perhaps 
this is not surprising given British tradition. Indeed, some of the classic resources 
on the British Constitution devote exceedingly little space to the judiciary and 
focus instead predominantly upon Parliament and the executive.359 For example, 
Sir Ivor Jennings once wrote that “[t]he law is what Parliament provides, and it 
is in Parliament that the focus of our liberties must be found.”360 
The preceding observation might strike an American reader well versed in 
Alexander Hamilton’s famous Federalist No. 78 essay as rather jarring. 
Hamilton envisioned that the American federal judiciary should “be an 
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”361 In other 
words, Hamilton envisioned the courts as playing a crucial role in checking the 
political branches, and as he explained in No. 78, the judicial independence 
secured by tenure and salary protection was crucial to that very task. Churchill, 
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by contrast, governed within a constitutional tradition that viewed Parliament as 
the primary mechanism for the protection of individual liberty. 
To be sure, even against this backdrop, there are those who have argued 
that the courts should have played a stronger role in Britain during the war. For 
example, Simpson has contended that “it is not clear that the courts had to wash 
their hands of responsibility as enthusiastically as they did. They could have 
carved out for themselves a larger role.”362 Perhaps the courts could have 
demanded greater transparency from the executive in detention cases or enforced 
some constraints by applying an objective test to the “reasonable belief” 
requirement set forth in Regulation 18B.363 After all, Parliament had not formally 
suspended the privilege during the war and, importantly, Parliament had 
amended the version of Regulation 18B that was before the Law Lords in 
Liversidge for the very purpose of curtailing the unlimited discretion that the 
original version of Regulation 18B had granted the Home Secretary. (As also 
noted earlier, the attorney general assumed that certain portions of the limiting 
language in Regulation 18B might be judicially enforced.364) Put another way, 
there is a strong argument that Parliament had indeed purported to constrain the 
Home Secretary’s discretion by requiring him to provide an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that national security warranted depriving a citizen 
of his or her liberty. 
What is most noteworthy about the British experience during World War II 
is that one of the leading voices to champion the British Constitution and legal 
traditions turned out to be the Prime Minister himself. Indeed, it was Churchill 
who urged the demise of the 18B regime.365 This is remarkable for two reasons. 
First, the British traditions heralded by Churchill derived not from a written and 
binding constitution, but from custom and tradition, from which Parliament had 
deviated on prior occasion.366 For a wartime executive nonetheless to champion 
such legal traditions against the tide of popular opinion and in the face of 
challenging wartime conditions is truly extraordinary. Second, the British 
experience lends support to the idea that the executive can and sometimes will 
take the lead in declaring and protecting a country’s constitutional values—even 
in wartime, and even absent prodding by the courts. On this score, it bears 
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highlighting that the British established the Advisory Committee panels within 
the executive branch to review internee cases, and although the Committee was 
often overruled by the Home Secretary, its recommendations did result in some 
releases.367 Of course, the United States government created nothing remotely 
comparable to review the cases of Japanese Americans incarcerated in the 
camps—instead detaining those who fell within the web of the military 
regulations indiscriminately. 
But important differences between the British and American legal 
frameworks and political contexts, as well as the implementation of their 
respective wartime detention policies, call into question just how much the 
British experience can inform debates over the separation of powers in the 
American constitutional system. First, as noted above, Churchill operated within 
a legal tradition that did not uniquely elevate the courts as the government actor 
charged with protecting individual liberties. To the contrary, as the leader of 
Parliament, Churchill likely conceived of his role and responsibilities as 
obligating him to marry his actions with the constitutional values that he 
understood to be foundational in British history and tradition. Roosevelt held a 
decidedly different view. He believed that any such responsibility belonged to 
the courts and was not a concern worthy of a wartime president’s time.368 
Second, Churchill never faced a general election during the war, unlike 
Roosevelt, who stood for reelection in 1944. In Great Britain, the three major 
political parties agreed to an “electoral truce” in 1939 pursuant to which they 
would not compete with each other for parliamentary seats for the “duration of 
the war.”369 This fact gave Churchill some insulation from popular opinion as he 
charted the country’s course in the war. This insulation, in turn, may well have 
factored into his willingness to push for an end to the Regulation 18B regime in 
1943, even though it still enjoyed considerable popular support.370 (The threat of 
a German invasion had passed by this point, a fact that likely also played a role 
in Churchill’s decision to turn completely against the Regulation 18B 
program.371) The fact that Roosevelt rebuffed the advice of those who counseled 
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him to close the Japanese American detention camps until after the 1944 election, 
only relenting after he won reelection and learned that the Court would rule 
against the government in Endo, further suggests that political context matters a 
great deal for an executive managing a war. It also suggests that a fixed schedule 
for elections like the American system may undermine any inclination on the 
part of the executive to protect civil liberties in wartime. 
A third major difference between the British and American detention 
policies during the war also reveals important lessons. Regulation 18B in policy 
and practice did not target any particular minority or racial group, but instead 
impacted individuals who came from some of the same walks of life as those 
who designed and carried out the detention policies. But in the United States, the 
military regulations that followed under 9066 specifically and exclusively 
targeted Japanese Americans, a minority population viewed by many as 
unassimilable foreigners, regardless of their citizenship status.372 Even the 
Supreme Court in its Hirabayashi decision expressly called into question the 
ability of Japanese Americans to assimilate into American society. Further, this 
same mindset appears throughout public statements and government documents 
surrounding the internment.373 (Notably, these discriminatory wartime policies 
came on top of naturalization policies that excluded many Asian immigrants 
from becoming citizens.374) As history has demonstrated, the majoritarian 
political branches in the United States are poorly suited to protect the interests 
of discrete and insular minorities. By contrast—given that the British 
government detained Churchill’s relatives and a member of Parliament under 
Regulation 18B,375 there is every reason to believe that the plight of those swept 
up in Regulation 18B resonated on some score with those who were charged with 
adopting and implementing the policy. 
All of this contextualizes the vast differences between the wartime 
detention of citizens in Britain versus the United States. These differences should 
give pause to any argument that relies upon the British experience as generally 
supporting the idea that the executive can self-regulate with respect to 
constitutional values and civil liberties in times of war, particularly where 
minority interests are at stake. Indeed, the American experience during the war 
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suggests just the opposite and calls into question the ability of both the executive 
and the courts to ensure that the government “turn[s] square corners” in its 
dealings with the people.376 Studying the lead-up to 9066 and the implementation 
of the internment policy during the war, moreover, turns up extensive evidence 
underscoring the conclusions drawn by a commission later appointed by 
Congress to study the internment. That commission found that the internment 
was the product of “race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political 
leadership.”377 This has much to teach us today about the assumptions that 
should inform our thinking about the separation of powers in the American 
constitutional framework. 
Begin, for instance, with the attorney general and the executive branch. 
Biddle has been criticized for failing to remain steadfast in his objections as to 
the wisdom and legality of internment.378 His legacy is certainly not helped by 
his January 30, 1942, memorandum to the President, which raised the possibility 
of suspension on the mainland.379 Nor is it helped by the memorandum that he 
wrote on February 20, 1942 (the day after the issuance of 9066), in which he 
advised the President that 9066 “gives very broad powers to the Secretary of War 
and the Military Commanders,” who could “exercise[]” their authority “with 
respect to Japanese, irrespective of their citizenship.”380 One of Biddle’s lawyers 
at the Justice Department, Edward Ennis, explained in a 1942 interview that for 
his boss “[t]he stakes were too high and the emergency too great. Therefore, the 
Attorney-General let the Army have its way.”381 
This mindset seems to have controlled in the War Department as well, 
where Stimson and his deputy McCloy ultimately came to view constitutional 
concerns as irrelevant in the face of overblown risk assessments and, more 
generally, their charge to prosecute a successful war.382 Other legal actors appear 
to have adopted similar views, including Solicitor General Charles Fahy, who 
litigated the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases in the Supreme Court while 
presenting false claims about military necessity.383 
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Then, there is Roosevelt. Why, in the face of opposition advanced by key 
advisers, did he issue 9066 and grant the sweeping authority to the War 
Department that DeWitt had requested? Indeed, the attorney general and the war 
secretary initially opposed the resulting policies—particularly that of 
internment—while Hoover and others expressed deep skepticism over the 
existence of any sound basis for such policies.384 Biddle and others had also 
counseled the president that any detention of citizens without a suspension would 
be unconstitutional. These facts naturally imply that Roosevelt himself was a 
driving force behind what followed. Historian Greg Robinson’s work supports 
this conclusion, detailing Roosevelt’s extensive involvement in decision to give 
the military broad authority over Japanese Americans as well as to delay 
rescinding 9066 and closing the camps until after the November 1944 election.385 
Roosevelt’s reluctance followed notwithstanding the pendency of Endo before 
the Supreme Court and against the counsel of several advisers who were 
prodding him to move more quickly.386 Robinson contends that Roosevelt’s 
personal predisposition was hostile and racist toward Japanese Americans, and 
that this was a major factor in Roosevelt’s decision to issue 9066 and leave the 
resulting military orders in operation for much of the war.387 
More generally, Roosevelt’s decisions seem to have followed from his 
strong inclination to defer to the military in wartime. For Roosevelt, the military 
had “primary direct responsibility for the achievement of war victory,” which 
“was prerequisite to all else.”388 A conversation between Roosevelt and War 
Department officials in the days leading up to issuance of 9066 supports this 
conclusion. In it, the President told the War Department to prepare a plan for 
wholesale evacuation, and he specifically noted his approval for such policies to 
encompass the removal of citizens.389 Following the meeting, Assistant 
Secretary of War McCloy reportedly said: “We have carte blanche to do what 
we want to as far as the President is concerned.”390 
Biddle recalls the President’s decision this way: 
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I do not think [President Roosevelt] was much concerned with the 
gravity or implications [of signing 9066]. He was never theoretical 
about things. What must be done to defend the country must be done. 
The decision was for his Secretary of War, not for the Attorney General, 
not even for J. Edgar Hoover . . . . Public opinion was on their side, so 
that there was no question of any substantial opposition . . . . Nor do I 
think that the constitutional difficulty plagued him—the Constitution 
has never greatly bothered any wartime President. That was a question 
of law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must decide.391 
Accordingly, Roosevelt bears much of the responsibility for setting in 
motion and keeping in place all that followed under the auspices of 9066. His 
position appears also to have been heavily influenced by public opinion and 
political pressure, as is revealed by his resistance to rescinding 9066 and closing 
the camps until after the 1944 presidential election.392 Further, and in stark 
contrast to his British counterpart, Roosevelt viewed it as the job of the courts, 
and not the president, to weigh the important constitutional questions that 9066 
and the resulting military regulations implicated. 
During the war, moreover, Congress played virtually no role in evaluating 
the propriety of the mass detention of Japanese Americans before or after the 
issuance of 9066. In fact, Congress engaged only one time with the issues, at the 
behest of the Secretary of War, when it passed legislation criminalizing 
disobedience of military orders issued under 9066.393 Otherwise, Congress never 
debated—much less formalized any decision—with respect to the internment 
policy. Congress’s virtually non-existent engagement during the war on this 
score stands on very different footing from Parliament’s. In stark contrast to 
Congress, Parliament repeatedly prodded the Home Office for information and 
engaged in several high-profile cases, such as the Mosley case, to exercise at 
least some oversight of the program.394 
In the end, the British and American chief executives struck decidedly 
different positions on the wisdom and lawfulness of the wartime detention of 
citizens. In the United States, Roosevelt gave the military a virtual blank check 
despite the complete lack of evidence suggesting any genuine security threat. He 
also acted against the legal advice from key advisers who correctly recognized 
that any policy sanctioning the detention of Japanese American citizens outside 
the context of a valid suspension would be unconstitutional. But in Churchill, 
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one sees an approach that bears a far stronger relationship with earlier wartime 
episodes in both Great Britain and the United States during which key political 
figures made a point of working within the governing legal framework in 
addressing the matter of potential domestic enemies. Consider, for example, the 
actions of Lord North and his administration during the American Revolutionary 
War. During that war, when faced with rising numbers of American prisoners 
coming to English shores, North’s cabinet sought advice from Lord Mansfield 
as to the legal status of the American Rebels.395 Once Mansfield counseled that 
Americans could claim the benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act as subjects, Lord 
North introduced suspension legislation in Parliament for the express purpose of 
legalizing the detention of American prisoners outside the criminal process.396 
Consider as well the actions of President Jefferson, who sought a suspension 
during the Burr Conspiracy.397 Once the House of Representatives rejected 
suspension legislation, Administration officials quickly turned over those 
prisoners then in military custody to civilian authorities, who now prosecuted the 
alleged conspirators criminally.398 Even President Lincoln—the so-called “great 
suspender”399—never once suggested during the Civil War that persons 
suspected of disloyalty could be detained preventively in the absence of a 
suspension.400 One is left to wonder why such legal considerations held so little 
sway in American political circles during World War II, unlike in earlier periods. 
Consider, in this regard, the prominence of the Suspension Clause in so much of 
the Civil War’s legal and political discourse. 
Ultimately, the distinctions between the American and British contexts and 
experiences during World War II likely explain the different positions of the 
chief executives. As noted above, Churchill functioned within a very different 
constitutional tradition, specifically one that looks to Parliament to guard 
constitutional liberties. Roosevelt, by contrast, fully subscribed to the view that 
any questions surrounding the constitutionality of the wartime policies under 
9066 were the proper province of the courts. In this regard, Roosevelt’s approach 
was in keeping with the view of many influential members of the Founding 
generation, who envisioned the courts playing an important checking role on the 
political branches while upholding constitutional values. Consider James 
Madison, who posited in that fateful year of 1789 that the “independent tribunals 
of justice will consider themselves . . . the guardians of [constitutional] Rights,” 
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and that “they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of 
power in the Legislature or Executive.”401 Indeed, this perspective also found 
favor in the famous Supreme Court decision in Marbury v. Madison, in which 
Chief Justice John Marshall declared that it is the role of the judiciary “to say 
what the law is.”402 
Nonetheless, the contrast is stark between Roosevelt and Jefferson, 
Lincoln, and earlier executives who internalized at least some regard for 
constitutional considerations in fashioning wartime detention policies. (This 
assumes that one can even call the Burr Conspiracy a “war,” a rather dubious 
proposition to be sure.) Given, moreover, that more recent presidents appear to 
have followed Roosevelt’s approach rather than that of earlier presidents, this 
history should give pause to anyone today who might advocate for a robust 
theory of popular constitutionalism that would diminish the role of the judiciary 
in fulfilling Madison’s vision.403 In this respect, consider the more recent actions 
of the Bush Administration in formulating detention policies with respect to so-
called enemy combatants—both citizens and aliens—in the wake of the attacks 
of September 11, 2001. With its policies targeting citizens for detention as enemy 
combatants, the Bush Administration went against much of the history of the 
Suspension Clause. Further, in its treatment of non-citizen detainees, the Bush 
Administration took the most aggressive approach possible, at times disclaiming 
any role for domestic or international law to govern its actions.404 
As also noted, the two chief executives faced different political pressures, 
with Roosevelt confronting a timely election during the war and Churchill being 
freed from standing in a general election until after the war. The different 
political contexts likely mattered greatly with respect to the freedom of each 
executive to stake out positions at odds with popular views. 
Finally, the British and American experiences were also distinct because of 
who they impacted. The simple fact is that the American internment policies that 
followed under 9066 exclusively targeted a discrete and insular minority with 
little foothold in the political process. Recall the suggestions of DeWitt and 
others in the lead up to 9066—later embraced by the Supreme Court in 
Hirabayashi—that Japanese Americans were unassimilable foreigners.405 
Combining these troubling views of key government officials with the fact that 
any minority group targeted by such policies is unlikely to wield much political 
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power, it is not surprising that the interests of Japanese American did not receive 
any airing in the political process.406 
Given the many institutional failings detailed here that occurred during the 
war, the role of the judiciary in such circumstances to enforce constitutional 
constraints upon the majoritarian political branches is surely at its zenith, a point 
that has been and should be accepted as not the least bit controversial.407 Here, 
too, contrasting the World War II British approach has much to teach us. To be 
sure, the lack of robust judicial review in Britain during the war is the subject to 
this day of criticism. But ultimately, Churchill changed course on Regulation 
18B and spearheaded the demise of the policies that it put in place. There is every 
reason to think that part of what drove such a shift was the fact that the plight of 
those impacted by the policies resonated with Churchill and others in 
government. This was not the case with Roosevelt and the animus openly 
displayed by many political actors and American courts toward the Japanese 
Americans who suffered losses of liberty and property for which they could 
never be made whole.408 
Even assuming that Roosevelt correctly believed believe that the judiciary 
was responsible for honoring and enforcing constitutional constraints on his 
authority to prosecute the war, the Supreme Court failed miserably in carrying 
out its charge during the war. (To be clear, Roosevelt’s position should not go 
unchallenged. After all, such a position openly abdicates any responsibility on 
the part of the executive to self-regulate on this score, which is impossible to 
square with the very same oath that the President takes to uphold and defend the 
Constitution.) 
When its actions came under challenge, the executive branch asserted that 
there was a sound factual and policy basis for the internment policy when, of 
course, this was not the case.409 The Supreme Court took these assertions at face 
value, deferring extensively to military claims of national security necessity in 
both Hirabayashi and Korematsu.410 Further, the Court seemed all too eager to 
defer on questions of constitutional law as well, issuing decisions that sanctioned 
racial and ethnic discrimination in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, while also 
failing to enforce in Endo the constitutional constraints on executive detention 
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that had long been understood to be at the heart of the Suspension Clause.411 To 
make matters worse, the Court delayed issuing Endo for political reasons.412 The 
results—two decisions that are now viewed as “anticanons” and one that cannot 
be reconciled with the entire history of the Suspension Clause—reveal the 
serious dangers inherent in judicial deference to the executive regarding national 
security in wartime.413 
There is much to criticize in the actions of both British and American 
judiciaries during the war. To borrow again from Professor Rostow, “[i]t is hard 
to imagine what courts are for if not to protect people against unconstitutional 
arrest.”414 Indeed, as Lord Atkin wrote in Liversidge, it bears remembering that 
at the heart of our shared Anglo-American legal tradition is the recognition that 
“one of the pillars of freedom [and] one of the principles of liberty [is] that the 
judges . . . stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on his 
liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in 
law.”415 
Although the Court seemed to have reclaimed much of its role in its 
decision in Duncan after the war, in many respects, one could argue that Duncan 
was a day late and a dollar short. After all, whatever their continuing legitimacy 
as legal precedent, Hirabayashi and Korematsu had the very real result of 
sanctioning the government’s unconstitutional detention of tens of thousands of 
United States citizens behind barbed wire in remote barren camps for years. This 
was neither our country’s, nor the judiciary’s, finest hour. 
CONCLUSION 
In the decades since their internment during World War II, many Japanese 
American survivors have embraced a famous quotation by Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes. Although Hughes essentially echoed Assistant Secretary of War 
McCloy’s assessment of the Constitution as “just a scrap of paper,” he drew an 
entirely different lesson from that premise. Specifically, he highlighted the 
importance of the people who stand behind the document and make its words 
real: 
You may think that the Constitution is your security—it is nothing but 
a bit of paper . . . . You may think that elaborate mechanism of 
government is your security—it is nothing at all, unless you have sound 
and uncorrupted public opinion to give life to your Constitution . . . .416 
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As a study of the British and American approaches to the internment of citizens 
during World War II reveals, Hughes’s remarks, offered in 1906, were prescient. 
Honoring constitutional principles does indeed demand “sound and uncorrupted 
public opinion.” Further, it requires thoughtful government officials willing to 
“give life to [the] Constitution” even when public opinion stands at odds with 
those principles. This position is best embodied by Churchill’s message to his 
Home Secretary urging the repeal of Regulation 18B. As he phrased things: 
“People who are not prepared to do unpopular things and to defy clamour are not 
fit to be Ministers in times of stress.”417 
In the United States, both the political branches and the Supreme Court 
failed to internalize Hughes’s aspirations. As a matter of substantive 
constitutional law, the internment of tens of thousands of Japanese American 
citizens egregiously violated the Suspension Clause. The Founding generation 
adopted the Clause to constitutionalize the protections of the English Habeas 
Corpus Act, and specifically its promise that one who could claim the protection 
of domestic law could not be detained outside the criminal process in the absence 
of a valid suspension.418 Thus, the Endo Court’s focus on loyalty was entirely 
beside the point.419 In the absence of suspension—an extreme state of affairs that 
the Constitution strictly limits to the situations of “Rebellion” or “Invasion”—
the constitutional habeas privilege ensures that persons who can claim the 
protection of domestic law may not be deprived of their freedom outside the 
formal criminal process.420 Loyalty tests—even assuming there could be such a 
thing—have never been a part of the suspension framework. 
In Great Britain, as the war unfolded, constitutional principles fared 
somewhat better than they did in the United States. But although the British 
experience regarding the detention of citizens supports the idea that even in 
wartime the executive can self-regulate, there are important differences between 
the legal tradition and political context in which the British policies were adopted 
and the manner in which they were implemented. And of course, even in Great 
Britain, one must recall that Churchill’s opposition and the winding down of the 
18B program took years to unfold.421 
This Article’s study of the very different approaches by Churchill and 
Roosevelt during World War II to preventive detention of citizens suggests that 
there may be important translation problems with the British experience for 
American theories regarding the separation of powers in wartime. Specifically, 
the American experience detailed herein reveals that internal checks within the 
political branches in the American constitutional tradition are likely to fail in 
times of war, especially when concerns over national security will most likely 
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overrun constitutional considerations and the executive internalizes electoral 
pressures. The failure of executive self-regulation is also likely where, as was 
the case with the Roosevelt Administration, there is a predisposition to leave 
elaboration and enforcement of constitutional considerations to the courts. 
Finally, the American experience also reveals that the failure to adhere to 
constitutional traditions and values on the part of the political branches is likely 
to manifest itself when the government implements policies targeting minority 
groups with little political power. Thus, in the lead-up to the issuance of 9066, it 
was of no moment that key officials in the Roosevelt Administration recognized 
glaring constitutional problems with many of the policies that would follow 
under the President’s order, including the decision to detain Japanese Americans 
in “Relocation Centers” throughout the war. Nor did it matter that high-level 
executive branch officials recognized that the factual predicate for the military 
regulations enacted under 9066 were dubious. 
The history explored herein likewise suggests that the common American 
practice of judicial deference to the political branches on wartime matters of 
national security is worth second-guessing.422 The Court’s opinions deferring to 
the government’s purported national security needs in Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu are now routinely taught to law students as the embarrassments that 
they are. Meanwhile, the Court’s decision in Endo mistakenly focused on the 
issue of loyalty, suggesting that such an elusive determination should be the 
central focus of wartime detention policies directed at persons who can lay claim 
to the protection of domestic law. Thus, even the victory of Endo—which did 
succeed in ushering in the demise of the camps—left far too much unresolved 
constitutional law on the table. Indeed, the inescapable judicial legacy of 
internment remains a historical precedent that sanctioned racial and ethnic 
discrimination, gutted the Suspension Clause, and gave constitutional sanction 
to “a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices.”423 How much better 
it would have been if the Court had taken to heart Alexander Hamilton’s 
prescient words at the Founding, predicting that undoubtedly future occasions 
would require “an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty 
as faithful guardians of the Constitution.”424 
The issues discussed in this historical treatment remain just as pressing 
today as they were during World War II. This past Term, the Supreme Court 
confronted constitutional challenges to the Trump Administration’s issuance of 
a series of orders targeting particular nationalities for exclusion from entry to the 
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country.425 And just as the Roosevelt Administration argued during World War 
II, the current administration maintained that its actions were predicated upon 
the needs of national security and it called upon the Court to give extensive—if 
not complete—deference to its decisions. In the view of the current 
Administration, the proper judicial course is not to “override[],” but instead to 
defer “to the President’s judgments on sensitive matters of national security and 
foreign relations,” leaving it to him, free of judicial interference, to decide the 
proper course “to protect the Nation.”426 
A majority of the Supreme Court essentially followed this course in 
upholding the so-called “Travel Ban,” holding that “the Executive’s evaluation 
of the underlying facts is entitled to appropriate weight, particularly in the 
context of litigation involving ‘sensitive and weighty interests of national 
security and foreign affairs.’”427 The majority likewise cautioned that the 
judiciary “cannot substitute [its] own assessment for the Executive’s predictive 
judgments” with respect to matters relating to “national security interests.”428 
Although the majority labored to distinguish the Travel Ban case from 
Korematsu as, among other things, involving non-citizens, the fact remains that 
the Court in Trump v. Hawaii embraced a wholly deferential posture with respect 
to the executive branch’s assertions regarding the needs of national security. It 
did so, moreover, in the context of reviewing a policy targeting particular 
nationalities and to a large extent a specific religion.429 A Court better versed in 
the perils of such an approach—as revealed in Korematsu and its companion 
cases that came before the Court during World War II—should have exercised 
greater pause in the face of such arguments. In this respect, we are left today to 
wonder whether we have learned anything from the past. Looking ahead, there 
is also the question whether Justice Jackson’s warning in his Korematsu dissent 
still rings true—namely, whether the Court has created precedents left to lie 
around like “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring 
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”430 
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